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A developing economy such as the Philippines faces the challenge of how to create an enabling 
environment for economic growth and development.  The policy development process leads to the creation 
of that environment but how does one nudge forward the policy development process? Why are some 
reforms adopted while others face stiff resistance? The policy development process is not a disembodied 
phenomenon but is nested in an effectively functional institutional setting.  There can be no effective policy 
development process if institutions supporting and implementing it are ineffective or dysfunctional.  Several 
factors may explain the acceptance of or resistance to reforms, such as the message content of the 
proposed reform or package of reforms, the relative impacts on various sectors of the economy, the identity 
of gainers and losers, the presence of a broad coalition of support or lack of it and many others.  This paper 
maintains that acceptance of or resistance to reforms or even of the whole policy development process may 
be influenced by the presence and active participation of institutions supporting the process.  Both the 
content (message) of the reform and the medium used for acceptance of the reform are equally important.  
In this paper the “medium” referred to is the set of institutions that help or motivate the policy development 
process.  
A distinction can be made between institutions “supporting” the policy development process and 
institutions “implementing” it. Typical discussions would focus on the important role of implementing 
institutions in the development agenda.  The recent experience of fast growing ASEAN countries such as 
Malaysia and Thailand shows that it is not sufficient to have the right development policies; it is equally, if 
not more important, to have effective (implementing) institutions.  A combination of efficient policies, 
enlightened and strong leadership and competent institutions is indispensable to growth and development.  
For instance, a country may enact a competition law in support of the market economy, which establishes “a 
framework for promoting the competitive process and economic efficiency” (Guasch and Spiller 1999, p. 
288) but it will need an effective operational structure to enforce the competition law.  Implementing 
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institutions whether formal or informal, are thus, the means through which authority is exercised in the 
management of resources of the state.  
However, the other type of institution, the “supporting” institution has also a unique role in the 
policy development process and in creating the enabling environment for well functioning markets that 
would deliver policy outcomes. This paper departs from the usual discourse on the need for effective 
implementing institutions.  Most discussions on the role of ‘institutions’ in the policy development process 
implicitly assume that those institutions are the ‘implementing’ institutions  The paper discusses the critical 
role that “supporting” institutions such as independent review institutions or commissions and coordinating 
institutions can play in moving forward the policy development process.    It is common to identify inputs to 
the policy making process as if these were given2 but in this paper, those inputs are not taken as given.  On 
the contrary, the paper considers how such inputs are produced and suggests a strategy to improve their 
production and dissemination to policy makers.  The paper uses the experience with current reform efforts 
of the country in public expenditure management to illustrate the strategic role of “supporting” institutions in 
producing and providing important inputs to key policy makers for decision making and thus, in nudging 
forward the policy development process.   
The paper discusses not only the instruments for moving forward the policy development process 
(e.g., the supporting institutions) but also the  process of moving it forward.  Implicitly, the paper 
acknowledges the limitations of focusing exclusively on what policy reforms are needed or on what 
institutional arrangements would bring about the policy development process and indicates the need to 
understand the process itself of the policy development process.  It is important to grasp how policy reforms 
are formulated, reviewed or amended and presented to the public and finally, to decision makers in the 
executive level, or if needed, to legislators.  The end goal of the policy development process is a new state 
of nature, that is, a reformed environment underpinned by particular reform measures but sometimes the 
discourse on this process says very little, if at all, about how to shift from a pre-reformed situation to the 
reformed situation, that is, the dynamics of moving to a new paradigm. To put in proper context the 
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II.  The Current Economic Situation, Institutions and the Need for Reforms 
 
  Coming out of the destruction wrought by the Second World War, the Philippines seemed to be 
better prepared than other countries in Southeast Asia to break from the ranks of poor, developing 
countries.  The irony is that the promise and potential seen in the fifties have remained as unrealized 
promise and untapped potential as well at the dawn of the 21st century.   The ‘boom-bust’ cycle of Philippine 
economic growth during the post-War period, an erratic growth record at best, shows that the country has 
somehow missed pathways to growth and development.  Thus, today the Philippines is one of the slowest-
growing economies in the region.   
The World Bank (2005) reported that from 1985 to 2003, per capita gross domestic product 
increased only by about 0.7% per year, well below the 3.7% average of neighboring countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam).  It was in the 1970s that the economy last experienced a 
sustained period of rapid growth, according to the same World Bank report.  The 1997 East Asian financial 
crisis has contributed to the decline in economic growth and the relative economic stagnation experienced 
by the country in the last few years.  There was very moderate economic growth at around 5% a year since 
2003 but other ASEAN countries, which were more adversely affected by the East Asian financial crisis, 
have once again galloped ahead of the faltering Philippine economy.  In the eighties private investors 
studiously ignored and bypassed the country and poured massive capital and technology into Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand.  Indeed, private investments have largely bypassed the country, which denied it 
tremendous opportunities for tapping not only much-needed financial capital but also technology and 
innovations, so crucial for acquiring competitiveness in global markets.  This phenomenon seems to be re-
emerging.   
The result of economic decline and stagnation is deep poverty, which has remained a major 
concern. Notwithstanding government reports, data show that the incidence of poverty appears to have 
increased from 36.9 per cent in 1997 to 39.5 per cent in 2000 even as other ASEAN countries have 
experienced a significant reduction in poverty incidence.   Orbeta (2004), keeping score of poverty incidence 
in the ASEAN region, noted that the current Philippine poverty incidence in both rural and urban areas is 
much higher than those of neighboring countries.  Poverty incidence in Malaysia was 7.5% in 1999, while in 
Thailand and Indonesia it was 9.8% and 18.2% respectively in 2002.  Vietnam’s poverty incidence in 2002 
was only 28.9%.  Based on the international poverty threshold of US$1 per day, the Philippines had 15.5% 
of population having less than US$1 per day while in Malaysia, the rate was 0.2% in 1999; in Thailand, 
Indonesia and Vietnam, the rates were 1.9%, 7.5% and 13.1% in 2002, respectively. 
Notwithstanding the economy’s weak performance, it is acknowledged that the growth potential of 
the country is considerable (World Bank 2005).  There are significant natural resources; a large pool of   4
managerial and entrepreneurial talent; and widespread proficiency in English. Reforms dating from the 80s 
have resulted in a liberal domestic and foreign investment regime and openness to trade. Remittances of 
nearly 10 percent of Gross National Produce (GNP) sustain domestic demand. The growth of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of over 6 percent in 2004 was the fastest in 15 years (World Bank 2005).  There is 
much room for improvement and growth and this where the policy development process plays a critical role. 
The Philippines has experienced some moderately successful economic policy reforms since the 
end of martial rule in 1986 when the Aquino administration restored the democratic framework for the 
country.  Former President Aquino dismantled sugar and coconut monopolies, liberalized trade and the 
financial markets and started the privatization of state-owned enterprises.  Subsequent administrations tried 
their hand in pushing outward the policy reform envelope.  The reforms in telecommunications led to the 
entry of more players and an improvement in access to telecommunications services.  The privatization of 
the water distribution system in Metro Manila through a competitive bidding of the concession was generally 
successful.  The water tariffs were substantially reduced from the prevailing tariff imposed by the 
government-owned Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and coverage was expanded.  
Because of reforms that have strengthened the economy,  the Philippines was able to participate actively in 
global trading markets and had benefited from the economic boom enjoyed by the United States, China and 
other major countries.   It has survived the Asian financial crisis of the late nineties and has managed to 
grow despite severe geopolitical tensions and the rising price of oil in the last few years.  It has, however, 
remained vulnerable to problems of rising domestic and external debt, the volatility of the oil market and the 
loss of export markets because of lack of competitiveness of domestic firms and the failure to attract foreign 
capital and technology in the scale that neighboring ASEAN countries like Malaysia and Thailand have 
enjoyed and have used to their advantage to fuel their respective economic growth3.  
The vulnerability of the economy only highlights the challenge to maintain and accelerate the pace 
of economic policy reform but somehow the reform efforts have stalled.  The World Bank’s (2005) 
investment climate assessment identified the poor quality of key infrastructure services, a fragile and 
underdeveloped financial system, and a perception that contracting and regulatory uncertainty adds costs of 
doing business as barriers that discourage to private investments.  Somehow, institutional and political 
constraints have contributed to the factors that have stymied policy reform efforts.  Worse, it appears that 
sometimes the government itself is an enemy of good policy outcomes.  The government has either 
reversed policy in critical areas such as trade and credit or stalled the fruition of good policy, e.g., electoral 
reforms.  An example of a policy reversal is a recently issued executive order, which lifted the prohibition 
against the provision of loans by government line departments and agencies to so-called target 
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beneficiaries.  Both Philippine experience and research unquestionably showed the inefficiency of 
subsidized credit programs and the huge fiscal cost of providing dole-outs.  Learning from this experience, 
government issued an executive order in 1998 which terminated those subsidized credit programs and 
encouraged private financial institutions to be more active in the credit markets (Llanto and Geron, 1999; 
Llanto, Geron and Tang, 1999b). The withdrawal of government line departments and agencies from the 
credit markets brought beneficial effects: more private financial institutions felt encouraged to provide small 
clients with access to loans and other financial services; government realized huge savings by stopping 
funding of subsidized credit programs; micro-enterprises started to get funding from private banks, NGOs 
and credit unions.  However, in September 2006, the government, bowing to self-serving political interests, 
reversed this policy.   
Thus, in recent years Philippines has slipped in competitiveness rankings and has experienced 
recent credit and outlook downgrades by the major rating agencies.  This is a cause for alarm because 
regional competition for investments has heated up, with other countries exerting a huge effort to present 
themselves as better investment alternatives, which are reflected in their higher competitiveness ranking 
and upgrades in credit ratings and outlook.   Private investors have expressed concern over the situation, 
which seems to picture the Philippines   as a risky environment for private investments with potential 
investors perceiving high risks, e.g., political and regulatory risks.   
As earlier stated, the economic policy reform momentum has to be maintained and accelerated.  It 
is an opportunity that can not be wasted because of the high cost to society of not reforming. Why have 
reforms been inadequate and what gaps are there in the policy making process that may have lead to this 
shortfall?    
The literature suggests that policy reform processes encounter conflict among powerful institutional 
factors, e.g., vested interests4.  In Philippine political economy, the different vested groups, which may be in 
conflict with each other or which may temporarily coalesce for a common objective, e.g., acquire power in a 
political contest, have their origins in the political and economic power of the economic elite. The power 
center is a centralized and patronage-ridden presidency that orchestrates the execution of policy and 
allocation of spoils. Such concentration of power is supported by power of families and clans in the local 
areas, within the context of a “neo-patrimonial” political system (Azfar, et.al., 2000).   
Because the president has discretion over disbursement and big-ticket government contracts, 
licensing authority, and fiscal management powers, politicians have to ally themselves with the chief 
executive to ensure funding for key projects and a major share in the patronage resources of the 
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government.  In turn, in the absence of effective political parties, the president has to count on local elites for 
electoral support and mobilization.  As a result, local elites can leverage local power effectively during 
elections and, in-between election periods, ask for major concessions, through the Congress, from the 
central government (Rocamora, 1995).  The leverage that the chief executive has on local politicians is 
matched by the leverage that local politicians have in their ability to collect votes from their local bases of 
power (Igaya, 1999). 
This local-central symmetry is perpetuated when Congress members routinely engage in party 
switching to bolster the ranks of the ruling party in successive elections, a practice which in turn stiffens the 
lack of any real programmatic or ideological separation among Philippine political parties (Franco, 2000). 
One result of this system is that the Philippine legislature by and large does not mediate differing interests; 
its policies, laws and resource priorities are seen widely as directly favoring powerful constituencies 
(Gonzalez and Mendoza, 2002). The Philippine legislature is thus, orientated toward a spoils systems 
designed to entrench the incumbents’ political and economic power rather than a system to balance and 
reward competing interests in society with a view to upholding the welfare of those with neither political nor 
economic power.  Politicians themselves design and modify institutions to stay in power or support a 
particular business interest.   Voting arrangements, financing of campaigns and political parties, and other 
institutions are maintained or revised to keep incumbents in office.  In the end, horrendous policies and 
institutions can be best understood from the perspective of entrenching the incumbents (Djankov, et al., 
2002).  
Various interpretations of Philippine political economy commonly suggest the likelihood of “capture” 
of the state and its instrumentalities by vested interests based on political clans (De Dios and Esfahani, 
2001).  In this context, public agencies serve as conduits for capture of both policies and public resources.  
State capture implies that corruption is not always merely a sideshow; instead, the very political and 
economic forces associated with capture play a pivotal role in shaping policies and political economy 
outcomes (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2005) in the process blurring the separation between public duties and 
private interests.  When economic and political forces are closely aligned, the very actors which must adopt 
and implement policies to curb corruption may face weak, or even negative incentives to do so---all the 
more so when institutional rules of the game affect resource accumulation strategies (Fritzen, 2006).  Thus, 
policy reforms may be supported or hijacked by powerful families, business groups and politicians with 
blessings from the top depending on whether or not those reforms would promote their self-interest, e.g., 
commercial and business interests, and centuries-old hold on political power.   
In the face of these roadblocks, it is imperative for the country as a whole to seize the day, so to 
speak, to build on past reform efforts and work hard to map out a reform agenda for the future.  Failure to   7
pursue further reforms to strengthen the economy could be fatal amidst threats to the multilateral trading 
framework that has “played a crucial role in the rapid economic growth and rising living standards that most 
of the world—including the poor—has enjoyed since 1945” (Krueger 2003), the country’s continuing 
dependence on a few trading partners and a narrow export base and limited fiscal space for development 
programs and activities. Indeed, in the words of Krueger (2003): “economic reform has to be continuous. 
That might sound obvious, but it is striking how, over the years, governments of all kinds have tended to 
think of reform as a discrete process, one that has a clear ending. But that is to misunderstand the nature of 
economic change. As economies evolve, so should their structures and institutions. Failure to reform 
impedes progress and impairs the growth of living standards”.  What may be the role of supporting 
institutions? 
III.  Supporting Institutions in the Policy Development Process 
 
  Following the seminal paper of Dee (2006), there are two types of supporting institutions that can 
support the policy development process, namely, (a) “an institution that coordinate policy making across 
different government ministries, ensuring that each ministry or department has access to the policy 
instruments most appropriate to its policy problems, and that the actions of one ministry or department do 
not cut across others”, and (b) an institution that “can undertake an independent policy review process, 
either in reviewing existing regulatory settings (ex post reviews), or reviewing policy proposals before 
decisions are made (ex ante reviews).”  Ex post reviews have the power to evaluate the effectiveness of 
existing policies while ex ante reviews have the ability to formulate new policy options.    
 
Coordinating institution 
The first type of institution is a coordinating body that can harmonize and synchronize the different 
development efforts in the government based on a shared development agenda as reflected in the 
Philippine Medium Term Development Plan.  The Philippines has a market-based economy where markets 
are allowed to work unimpeded unless there are strong reasons and justifications for intervention or 
regulation.  Market competition can deliver efficient development outcomes but government may have 
additional policy objectives besides economic efficiency (Dee 2006) such as distributive justice, poverty 
reduction or the improvement of the distribution of income and asset endowments, which are not the 
concern of markets and the price system (Canlas 2004).  Thus, there may be a scope for regulation or 
intervention and in such instances policy coordination will be indispensable so as not to unduly disrupt the 
efficient functioning of markets.   8
The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) serves as the national and regional 
development plan and program coordinator based on its mandate from Presidential Decree 1 (September 
21, 1972) and Executive Order 230 (July 22, 1987). It issues the planning guidelines and conducts multi-
sectoral and regional consultations for inputs to the development plan, that is, the Philippine Medium Term 
Development Plan.  It is tasked with the coordination of official development assistance and the appraisal of 
programs and projects and conducts program and project evaluation and on-site reviews and consultations.  
It has two separate and distinct entities: (a) the NEDA Board and (b) the Secretariat.  The NEDA Board is a 
cabinet level board composed of the major government departments (ministries) and is chaired by the 
President of the Philippines.  The Secretariat provides technical and secretariat services to the different 
NEDA Committees (Investment Coordination Committee, Infrastructure Committee, Development Budget 
and Coordination Committee, and the Tax and Tariff Committee, the Regional Development Councils, the 
Philippine Council for Sustainable Development, National Land Use Committee), inter-agency bodies in 
governments and other clients such as local government units.  It is uniquely situated in the government 
bureaucracy because it has comprehensive information on the implementation of government programs and 
projects and policies and has the capacity to give comments on economic policies pursued by the 
government.    
The 1987 Constitution ensures the role of NEDA in the economy.  Article XII, Section 9 provides 
that “the Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency …which shall, after 
consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units, 
recommend to Congress, and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for 
national development.” Section 9 further stipulates that “until the Congress provides otherwise, the National 
Economic and Development Authority shall function as the independent planning agency of the 
government.”  However, Congress has yet to pass an enabling law to implement the Constitutional directive.   
On the basis of its mandate, NEDA is also well positioned to provide an economy-wide 
perspective. It is the only agency which has a whole-of-economy outlook, and is well-placed to install 
institutional strategies that can improve the country’s microeconomic policy structure; every other agency is 
focused on narrow sector concerns.  
As a public body with a clear constitutional mandate, NEDA has “latent” powers to mainstream 
policy development process in the bureaucracy but it has not exercised it, choosing instead to act as a mere 
coordinator of government policies and programs.  NEDA is currently hounded by institutional weaknesses, 
e.g., loss of key technical personnel and inability to find suitable replacements to those who have resigned, 
transferred to other agencies or retired. Years of coordination of various agency plans, the political   9
leadership’s lack of a clear vision and coherent development strategy for the country, and a rather short 
attention span that is driven by its ”coordinative” role, have made NEDA prey to the routine preparation of 
guidelines for national planning and the packaging of the medium term Philippine development plan.  
A recently issued presidential fiat, Executive Order 230, reorganized NEDA to enhance its ability to 
coordinate the development planning and policy formulation process. It is tasked to provide technical staff 
support and assistance including the conduct of studies and the development of policy measures and other 
recommendations. These key ingredients put NEDA right up to the area of the policy development process.  
Even without the necessary legislation that will transform it into an independent planning agency, NEDA can 
choose to take advantage of its economy-wide view and exercise its latent powers to plan, review, and act 
as chief economic advisor to the Executive, and in a larger sense, be an effective coordinating body.  That 
NEDA proper is a policy making body chaired by the President of the Philippines may have its drawback as 
a politicized organization but on the other hand, being the chief policy making body in the bureaucracy has 
its advantages.  It can very well be an effective coordinator of the policy development process.  The 
dynamic tension here is that between the technocrats (in the NEDA secretariat) and the cabinet members, 
all political appointees, with their own political goals and mandates (NEDA proper) in their respective 
approach to the policy development process.  
A government department or ministry that can exercise an agency-wide or inter-agency 
coordination is the Department of Budget and Management.  Along this line of thinking, the Department of 
Budget and Management (DBM), as keeper of the purse, would be better placed than other agencies to 
ensure wider policy coordination and to organize and head an inter-agency policy coalition. However, it has 
to have the political and organizational will, capability and incentive to exercise a coordinative role in the 
policy development process.  Its clout rests on the fact that it can demand adherence to and implementation 
of policy reforms as a condition for releasing agency funds.  Recently, it has espoused public expenditure 
reforms and has openly required various line agencies and corporations to adhere to performance-based or 
outcome-oriented budgeting.  It has announced that government budgeting system will shift to a 
performance-based system by the year 2007, which creates an environment that demands improved 
performance by government agencies and imposes accountability for resource use.   The motivation for 
budgetary reform arises from the need to improve public spending for macroeconomic reasons and to have 
greater efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector.    
There is a general agreement among the oversight agencies about the need to change its existing 
budgetary system but it took DBM a long time to generate consensus about the need to shift to results-
based budgeting and a performance management.  Aided by technical assistance grants from donors, the   10
DBM as a coordinating body has led efforts to reform the budgeting system, working with other oversight 
agencies (NEDA and the Department of Finance).   Thus, convinced that the way to go is to have a 
performance culture and accountability in government, the incumbent secretary (minister) of the budget 
publicly announced these budgetary reforms in his presentation to the Philippine Development Forum, a 
venue for government, donors and stakeholders to assess the country’s development strategy and agenda 
and to agree on common paths for action in Tagaytay City on March 2006. 
The current agenda for the Public Expenditure Management Reforms consists of the following 
mutually supportive and inter-dependent measures5:  
•  The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF); 
•  The Organizational Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF); and 
•  An Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation framework. 
 
There is inter-dependence among the three measures because the successful pursuit of one 
necessitates the presence of the others. MTEF is the framework needed for predictable funding to multi-
year program, projects and activities. Without MTEF, it would be difficult for OPIF to succeed because 
departments can not drive their organization for results without predictable budgetary support.  Without 
OPIF, the government does not have an effective mechanism to ensure that policy choices will be prioritized 
and pursued and to evaluate whether such choices are effective in terms of delivering outcomes.  An 
accountability, monitoring and evaluation framework works hand in hand with both MTEF and OPIF to make 
certain that resources are truly creating expected impacts delivered by responsible parties6.  These three 
components are essential for Results-Based or Performance-Based Budgeting. 
Results-Based Budgeting moves away from a control on inputs by oversight departments to measuring 
and accounting for results.  A natural corollary for OPIF is a transparent and well-enforced accountability 
system and strong monitoring and evaluation capability of the oversight departments and agencies.7  
       The DBM together with other oversight agencies (NEDA and the Department of Finance) under the 
NEDA committee called the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) has pursued radical 
fiscal reforms on the expenditure side.  The overall reform effort is known as Public Expenditure 
Management (PEM) Reform, which is composed of two broad components: (a) Organizational Performance 
                                                 
5 http://www.euforic.org/dpmf/943db 
 
6 See ibid.  
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Indicator Framework (OPIF) and (b) Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF8).  DBM documents 
describe OPIF as “an approach to expenditure management that directs resources towards results and 
accounts for performance.  It enables agencies to focus efforts and resources on core functions and on 
delivering high impact activities at reasonable costs and quantities.”9  OPIF is an important instrument in the 
tool kit of DBM in coordinating the policy development process because it provides an analytical approach 
(based on a logical framework) linking societal and sectoral goals, organizational outcomes and outputs.  A 
set of performance indicators provides key information on the accomplishments of departments and 
agencies based on pre-determined targets and measures.   Currently, DBM receives technical assistance 
from donors who drew from the earlier experience of Australia in public expenditure management reform.  A 
description of the main innovation- the outcome-output framework pursued by the Department of Finance of 




The main innovation of the government during the second wave of public sector reforms with the election of 
a conservative coalition government was its outcomes and outputs framework requiring departments to 
agree with their ministers on the outcomes—the government objectives—towards which they are working, 
and to also agree the on departmental outputs which would be produced to help achieve these outcomes.  
The three objectives of the outcomes and outputs framework are: First, to support the government’s policy 
development; Second, to support and strengthen departments’ internal management, including staff 
learning; and last, to strengthen external reporting, for accountability purposes. 
 
The outcomes and outputs framework has the potential to: 
 
•  foster agreement among key stakeholders concerning expected standards of performance; 
•  assist benchmarking comparisons across departments, and between the public and private 
sectors. This facilitates the ability of the government to take advantage of potential efficiency gains 
by selecting least-cost service providers.  Moreover the shift towards accrual accounting will also 
facilitate such an approach; 
•  support the different  departments in understanding the logical (and desirably evidenced-based) 
links between departmental spending, their activities, their outputs, and their contribution to desired 
outcomes; and 
•  help departments to cope better with management complexity, particularly when the work of 
several departments jointly impinges on achievement of a particular outcome objective. This 
relates to the concept of ‘joined-up government’. 
 
Source: Mackay (2004) 
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9 Organizational Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF): Fiscal year 2007 Performance Budget for Twenty 
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As a coordinating body for the work of the entire bureaucracy and government-owned and 
controlled corporations that require subsidies from the government, DBM has to be able to establish where 
public sector resources are being used and how effectively the outputs from the use of those resources 
deliver organizational outcomes.  Here we have a combination of a supporting institution (to the policy 
development process) possessing a potent tool (OPIF and MTEF) to orchestrate the policy development 
process.  Indeed, the DBM is now flexing its muscle to shift from a purely fiscal management agency 
concerned with budget allocation and cash release to a more coordinative public sector management entity 
that motivate implementing institutions (e.g., departments, government-owned and controlled corporations) 
to deliver specific outputs that meet organization outcomes, which in turn contribute to societal/sectoral 
goals.  This is a strategic redirection in its role that provides a better platform for supporting the policy 
development process.   
To illustrate the potential contribution of OPIF (as a tool) and the DBM (as a coordinating body) in 
the policy development process, I describe below recent work of DBM in developing log frames for at least 
twenty departments of the national government10.  The OPIF clarifies roles, functions, and accountabilities 
among agencies, a key ingredient to support the policy development process.  It introduces a tool for better 
internal governance among the agencies by providing them greater flexibility and control over resource 
utilization with accountability specified at the same time. OPIF helps in enhancing transparency and 
improving reporting agency accomplishments to the public and to policy makers.  In this way, the policy 
development process becomes adequately supported.   
According to DBM, an early form of the OPIF was introduced in the 1998 budget with BP 206: 
Agency Program/Activity and Major Outputs.  The present OPIF was introduced in the budget preparation 
process in the 2005 Budget Call.  A budget matrix established the linkage between 
programs/projects/activities (PAPs) on the one hand and the major final outputs (MFOs) on the other.  The 
Budget Call also required agency performance measures through performance indicators and targets by 
major final outputs.  The MFOs refer to goods and services that an agency is mandated to deliver to 
external clients, that is, the public, through the implementation of agency PAPs.   
The mainstreaming process for the OPIF is “an iterative and evolving process”, which DBM leads 
through a series of workshops, coordination and harmonization meetings with the various agencies.  DBM 
with the help of donors (AusAID and ADB), which provided consultants, rolled out the OPIF in preparation of 
the 2007 budget.  A series of workshops, coordination and harmonization meetings, discussions and “write-
shops” were conducted with agencies.  In those activities, the DBM directors in charge of rolling out the 
OPIF were invariably present to provide guidance and coordination.  The DBM coordinated the identification 
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and development of MFOs, the harmonization of MFOs from the oversight and implementing standpoints, 
the validation of the OPIF logical framework and alignment of agency MFOs with the log frame/MFOs of the 
‘mother’ department, e.g., log frame of the Bureau of Internal Revenue vis-à-vis the log frame of the 
Department of Finance.  This involved iterations at the department and intra-department level, as well as at 
the oversight level.  Bureau or agency (sub-department) level MFOs and logical frameworks have to be 
harmonized and linked with that of the whole (“mother”) department.   An example of a log frame, which was 
developed by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and DBM through those workshops, discussions, write-shops, 
etc., is shown in Box 2.   
Based on the experience of DBM in February to May 2006 when the roll out was earnestly 
pursued, it is necessary to involve the agencies in the process of developing their respective log frames so 
that ownership and accountability may reside with those agencies.  The resulting log frames for at least 20 
departments were collected in one document, which will accompany and support the major budget 
documents, namely, the National Expenditure Program, the President’s Budget Message and the 2007 
Budget Executive and Staffing Summary.  All of these will be submitted by the President to Congress. 
The main challenge facing DBM in fully coordinating and leading the utilization of OPIF and MTEF 
(a three year rolling budget framework) across the bureaucracy is the acceptance by Congress of these 
radical reforms in public expenditure management.  Congress is used to and expectedly prefers annual 
appropriation in which specific line expenditure items are scrutinized and approved.  The annual ritual of 
budgetary appropriation is an exercise of legislative power over the purse and is jealously guarded by 
Congress.  The budgetary decision calculus, which is exercised annually, provides Congress with a process 
to allocate resources to sectors and target beneficiaries according to their political importance or to the 
benefit that accrues to the legislators.  Budgetary appropriation is as much an exercise of allocating 
resources to address development goals as an avenue for the distribution of benefits based on the political 
calculus.  The latter case reflects the characterization given by Kimenyi and Mbaka (1993) to politicians as 
brokers of wealth transfers between various interest groups.  On the other hand, there is the view that 
reforms start with political initiatives (Aucoin 1990, 1995; Kingdon 1984; Peters 2001; Savoie 2000) and that 
properly understood in terms of benefits and costs (to losing parties), reforms have a scope for adoption by 
politicians. There are no easy answers or solutions to this challenge and this is not the occasion to discuss 
it.   
However, it should be noted that the opportunities for reform such as the recent effort to improve 
public expenditure management do not come as often as reformers such as DBM or NEDA would like them 
to.  Efficiency gains in government may not be properly understood or even appreciated by the voting public, 
and thus, politicians may dismiss reforms as irrelevant or untimely.  Following Williamson and Haggard   14
(1994), politicians may have a lesser belief in or regard for the benefits of economic reform while the general 
public, especially specific interests bound to lose certain privileges may even have much less belief in it.  As 
supporting institutions to the policy development process, DBM and NEDA are aware of the shifting sands of 
policy making and policy reform in the Philippines.   
The following features of public policies pointed out by Spiller and Tommasi (2002) and Bambaci, 
Spiller and Tommasi (2001) in Argentina seem to reflect the Philippine situation: (i) public policies are 
oftentimes too volatile, being changed too easily with (sometimes minor) changes in political winds; (ii) 
oftentimes, precisely to avoid that opportunistic volatility, rigid mechanisms are put in place to instrument 
long term policies; (iii) there is poor coordination among different governmental units operating over 
interrelated policy arenas (among levels of government . . . , among departments within a given level, 
among sub-national governments); (iv) some welfare enhancing reforms are not instrumented; and (v) there 
is underinvestment in capacity building for improving public policies. All the more, these coordinating bodies 
in the governmental bureaucracy should stay engaged and locked in a continuing dialogue with politicians 
and the Chief Executive on how best to allocate and use the budget to deliver good policy outcomes and 
meet societal and sectoral goals.  Convincing them that good economics is good politics underpins the 
reform efforts but the coordinating bodies (DBM and NEDA) need to improve their technical as well as 
political skills in the policy development process. It is obvious that the benefits of the reforms have to be 
effectively communicated to the general public to generate a constituency for reforms.   
  An important element of the communication strategy is to link up with independent policy review 
institution(s), which provide an objective, third-party assessment of the policy development process.   
 
Independent policy review institution 
The second type of institution can provide an objective assessment of development efforts, do 
performance reviews and identify future pathways for reform and development.  These institutions may be 
do either ex ante or ex post reviews or both.  Ex post reviews are utilized to evaluate the effectiveness of 
existing policies or past development programs and effort while ex ante reviews are used to identify and 
formulate new policy options.   Both types of policy reviews are crucial for the policy development process.  
 
Ex post reviews 
 
According to Dee (2006 page 71), “there may be an initial role for a review agency to undertake 
policy review work to identify the indirect budgetary or other costs of poorly targeted or poorly coordinated 
decision-making. . .”  The academic and research community composed of private and state universities,   15
private research institutes or research centers, and even NGOs engaged in policy watch may fulfill such role 
to do ex post policy reviews.  Dee mentions “academic think-tanks, and even private consulting firms, whose 
resources and expertise could be brought to bear in the policy review process (page 71).” Independent 
research or evaluations may be commissioned by the government (that is, by the oversight or coordinating 
bodies namely, the DBM and NEDA) to those entities.  An important consideration, however, is the 
credibility of those institutions, an issue that will be tackled later in this section. 
Looming in the horizon as an independent policy review body is the Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies (PIDS), a research institute created on September 26, 1977 by Presidential Decree 
No. 1201. PIDS is organized as a non-stock, non-profit government corporation and enjoys a certain degree 
of financial autonomy because of the endowment provided to it by government upon its creation.  It is partly 
supported by an annual subsidy from the government because of the small size of the endowment fund 
relative to the research agenda and work plan that are submitted to and approved by its Board of Trustees. 
PIDS was established to respond to the critical and growing need for independent research for 
planning and policy formulation.   In general, PIDS research is envisioned to help government planners and 
policy-makers in the executive and legislative branches of government. An independent board of trustees 
who are not political appointees but who were selected on the basis of their integrity, professionalism and 
academic qualifications provides policy direction to the research agenda of the institute.  The Chairman of 
the Board is the Secretary of Socio-economic Planning.   He is not appointed to the Board but is a de-facto 
member by virtue of his position as Director General of NEDA.  PIDS is an agency attached to NEDA for 
administrative supervision only.  
 
The PIDS has proven itself as an independent and impartial policy review institution and analyst 
throughout more than twenty five years of existence.  The research studies and policy analysis conducted 
by the research fellows, who also collaborate with a network of private and state universities have always 
taken the interest of the country at large.  Its main drawbacks are (a) the small size of its endowment fund, 
which has limited its research scope and activities and (b) its dependence on the government for an annual 
subsidy to augment the endowment fund, which leaves it vulnerable to political intervention.  It is noted that 
the annual subsidy has to pass muster the scrutiny of the Congress. 
An important feature of the policy review agency is its credibility. In the case of the PIDS, it has the 
desirable characteristics of an independent policy review institution.  The minimum requirement for an 
appointment to a fellow position is a Ph.D in Economics, Statistics or related sciences.  The research 
associates are holders of masters’ degrees while the research assistants are graduates of reputable 
universities.  Its research agenda is vetted by an independent team of experts from the fields of economics,   16
law, public administration and other fields, who are hired by the Board of Trustees to prepare and submit for 
Board approval a rolling five-year research agenda covering critical topics and issues in the policy 
development process.  It has statutory independence, consults publicly and widely and has an economy-
wide view in providing recommendations.  A network of researchers from other organizations, e.g., private 
universities, complements the PIDS research team and thus, addresses any skill gap. 
Following Dee’s understanding of “credibility,” another distinguishing feature is that “policy reviews 
not be consistently ignored without cost.”  A strategy is “to make the reviews mandatory” and additionally, 
“to empower the review institutions to subpoena evidence from stakeholders, if necessary.”  These desirable 
features are absent in the Philippine experience with independent reviews.  It is true that Philippine policy 
makers take cognizance of the results and recommendations of independent reviews but they can also at 
the same time studiously ignore them.  The political calculus comes to the picture.  It seems that the policy 
makers/decision makers consider the political weight of the constituencies that support the 
recommendations for policy reform and that of opponents of reform who sense the danger of losing 
privileges and advantages because of the reform effort.  In this regard, the “marshalling of countervailing 
interests against a particular vested interest” is a further strategy “for maintaining credibility.”11 The strategy 
calls for turning “countervailing interests” into “powerful allies of policy review institutions.”  The linking 
strategy may work well for PIDS, which is not geared for advocacy.  It sees as its principal mandate the 
production of independent policy reviews, research and analysis, which are turned over to the public domain 
by way of publications, seminars, workshops, testimonies in hearings arranged by various Congressional 
committees.  There is no conscious effort to advocate for support of the policy recommendations by PIDS 
fellows; instead those recommendations are left to the market place of ideas to compete with other positions 
and findings.  The real world politics of reform requires a broad-based coalition of support that politicians will 
find difficult to ignore lest they experience the erosion of support which makes tenuous their hold to power.  
Fortunately, in the Philippines, there is a range of civil society organizations that are on the watch for policy 
reforms and that are willing to advocate for those reforms, using a diversity of tactics, e.g., public forums, 
conferences, even street marches.  The challenge is to forge a strong link between independent policy 
review institutions such as the PIDS and those civil society organizations and similar interest groups.  Thus, 
the combination of a supporting institution such as an independent policy review institution and civil society 
watch dogs may prove to be strategic in the policy development process. 
 
Ex ante reviews 
 
                                                 
11 Phrases in quotation marks are from Dee’s paper (page 72).   17
Another vital element in the policy development process is the periodic conduct of ex ante reviews, 
which are important instruments for deciding on competing policy options.  This kind of review may entail an 
evaluation of proposed spending priorities of departments, proposed reforms, and others..  The experience 
of Australia in this regard is quite instructive as the evaluation exercise helps pinpoint accountability, reduce 
cost (generate savings) and thus, leads to good policy choices. 
The evolution of Australia’s evaluation capacity paved the way to improved governance.  It assisted the 
Cabinet in decision-making and prioritization over the construction of the budget, and in supporting internal 
program management within line departments.  Eventually, every aspect of Australian governance fell under 
the influence of formal program evaluations, including its budgetary institutions.12  In response to a looming 
fiscal crisis in the early 1980’s, the newly-elected reformist Labor government of Australia embarked on an 
ambitious wave of public sector reforms that eventually brought down the share of federal government 
outlays in GDP from 30% in 1984-85 to 23% in 1989-90.  Central to these reforms is the introduction of a 
medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF).  The effect of this included some initial tangible changes, 
namely: 
 
•  Substantial autonomy for departments in their spending of administrative expenses (including 
salaries), but with these administrative expenses being strictly cash-limited; 
•  Greater surety about future resource availability to departmental managers via a system of three-
year forward estimates of administrative and all other program expenses; and 
•  A major reduction in the number of departments through amalgamation, to achieve less balkanized 
policy advice and to encourage the internal reallocation of resources through portfolio budgeting. 
 
In time, the Department of Finance (Australia) undertook a diagnostic review and discovered that (a) 
there is a lack of integration of evaluation into corporate and financial decision-making; (b) evaluations 
tended to focus on efficiency and process issues rather on the more fundamental question of overall 
program effectiveness—i.e., whether or not programs were actually meeting their objectives; and (c) a poor 
level of evaluation shills and analytical capacity; and last, that the role of central departments in evaluation, 
especially the Department of Finance was unclear.  The findings in this diagnostic study was the basis for 
the Department of Finance to seek and eventually secure consent of the Cabinet to a formal, ongoing 
evaluation strategy for all departments in late 1988.   
  Over 530 evaluation reports were published between 1993 and 1997) that provided a growing 
‘library’ of evaluation findings which were exposed to peer scrutiny mainly because the Department of 
Finance made available a register of published evaluation reports. 
                                                 
12 This section draws from Mackay (1998 and 2004).   18
These evaluations were heavily utilized in the budget process.  It has provided the Cabinet a basis 
for the development of policy options.  For instance, in the 1990-91 budget about A$230 million (around 
US$175 million) of new policy proposals were deemed to have been directly or indirectly influenced by the 
findings of an evaluation. This had risen to A$2300 million by 1994-1995.  The proportion of new policy 
proposals influenced by evaluation rose from 23% to 77% over both periods.  The box below shows an 






Source: As quoted in Mackay (1998) 
 
 
  Turning to the Philippine situation, the government has some rudimentary instruments for this kind 
of evaluation or reviews, which if improved, may be used to identify accountability.  The DBM conducts an 
Agency Performance Review (APR) to review the performance of departments and agencies. One   19
constraint is that DBM tends to rely on the information and data submitted by the departments and agencies 
because of the lack of mechanism for getting more objective data, and inadequate monitoring and 
evaluation systems at the department/agency level.  Compliance may be inadequate because agencies do 
not feel compelled to make a good accounting of their performance because it seems that the general 
attitude is that they would anyway get the usual budget (baseline) plus x%.  On the other hand, the NEDA 
prepares another “accountability” document, the Socio-Economic Report (SER) but it has a fundamental 
weakness: inability of NEDA to validate reported outcomes and the tendency of agencies to provide mostly 
general information. There may be a scope for developing an instrument for policy review and evaluation 
using as basis the experience with the APR and SER.  An independent policy review institution may be 
tasked to undertake this.  The end result could be a powerful instrument for budget and performance review 
to facilitate prioritization among competing policies. 
 
  Of course, there may be synergy between both ex ante and ex post reviews.  The findings from the 
reviews of existing policies by PIDS could be used by the departments (ministries) such as DBM and NEDA 
in improving its own evaluation or review of government policies and programs.  It may be possible for the 
departments to use the results of ex post reviews done by independent policy review institutions such as the 
PIDS in their ex ante policy formulation process.  The end result, like that of Australia, is a clear-cut, 
transparent, and evidence-based method of prioritization and implementation of government programs and 
spending priorities.  Such evidence-based methods or instruments could be a powerful tool to blunt the 
constant attempts of vested groups allied with corrupt politicians to subvert national welfare in favor of their 
self-serving interests.   
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The policy development process needs the effective implementing institutions as well as supporting 
institutions.  The case for latter is not as explicitly acknowledged compared to the former.   The paper 
showed the need for both coordinating bodies and independent policy review institutions to support the 
policy development process.  It highlighted the role of particular coordinating and policy review institutions in 
the policy development process and identified how they may be strengthened or transformed into more 
effective institutions.  As well, the paper discussed various tools used by coordinating and policy review 
institutions to support the policy development process such as workshops, seminars, independent policy 
analysis, publications, linking with advocacy groups and building broad coalitions in support of the policy 
development process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Coming out of the destruction wrought by the Second World War, the Philippines seemed to be 
better prepared than other countries in Southeast Asia to break from the ranks of poor, developing 
countries.  The irony is that the promise and potential seen in the fifties have remained as unrealized 
promise and untapped potential well at the dawn of the 21st century.   The ‘boom-bust’ cycle of Philippine 
economic growth during the post-War period, an erratic growth record at best, shows that the country has 
somehow missed pathways to growth and development.  Thus, today the Philippines is one of the slowest-
growing economies in the region.   
 
The World Bank (2005) reported that from 1985 to 2003, per capita gross domestic product 
increased only by about 0.7% per year, well below the 3.7% average of neighboring countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam).  It was in the 1970s that the economy last experienced a 
sustained period of rapid growth, according to the same World Bank report.  The 1997 East Asian financial 
crisis has contributed to the decline in economic growth and the relative economic stagnation experienced 
by the country in the last few years.  There was very moderate economic growth at around 5% a year since 
2003 but other ASEAN countries, which were more adversely affected by the East Asian financial crisis, 
have once again galloped ahead of the faltering Philippine economy.  The same spectacle in the eighties 
when investors studiously ignored and bypassed the country, pouring massive capital and technology into 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, seems to be re-emerging.  Indeed, private investments have largely 
bypassed the country, which denied it tremendous opportunities for tapping not only much-needed financial 
capital but also technology and innovations, so crucial for acquiring competitiveness in global markets.  
Comparisons with other countries show that the Philippines “remains at the bottom of the list of overall 
competitiveness rankings and various business environment indicators” (World Bank 2005), which do not 
augur well for growth, trade and competitiveness.   
 
The result of economic decline and stagnation is deep poverty, which has remained a major 
concern. Notwithstanding government reports, data show that the incidence of poverty appears to have 
risen from 36.9 per cent in 1997 to 39.5 per cent in 2000 even as other ASEAN countries have experienced 
a significant reduction in poverty incidence.   Orbeta (2004), keeping score of poverty incidence in the 
ASEAN region, noted that the current Philippine poverty incidence in both rural and urban areas is much 
higher than those of neighboring countries.  Poverty incidence in Malaysia was 7.5% in 1999, while in 
Thailand and Indonesia it was 9.8% and 18.2% respectively in 2002.  Vietnam’s poverty incidence in 2002 
was only 28.9%.  Based on the international poverty threshold of US$1 per day, the Philippines had 15.5% 
of population having less than US$1 per day while in Malaysia, the rate was 0.2% in 1999; in Thailand, 
Indonesia and Vietnam, the rates were 1.9%, 7.5% and 13.1% in 2002, respectively. 
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  This is a complex and difficult question to answer but we submit that the weaknesses and in some 
instances incompetence and downright corruption of Philippine institutions have much to do with the 
country’s dismal performance in economic growth and poverty reduction. Bad governance has much to do 
with those weaknesses and incompetence. The 2004 World Bank investment climate assessment ranked 
corruption as a top barrier to doing business in the country.  It cites an estimate made by the government 
itself of ‘potential leakage (i.e., corruption, underscoring supplied) in combined public-private transactions, 
which included purchases for build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects for 2001,’ . . . amounting to ‘Pesos 74 
billion.’  To its credit, the government has attempted to address the corruption problem by introducing a 
procurement law, conducting so-called ‘lifestyle checks’ of officials and employees in the revenue collecting 
agencies, that is, the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs, and making several 
pronouncements of imposing the full strength of the law on corrupt bureaucrats.  However, weak political 
leadership and ineffective institutions have undermined the effort. 
 
This paper is about the importance of effective institutional and regulatory frameworks in 
orchestrating the policy development process in a developing economy such as the Philippines and the 
need to create competent institutions to ‘nudge such process in the direction of implementing better policies’ 
(Dee 2006).  The policy development process can sometimes be a very difficult and demanding route given 
competing interests, weak leadership and inequitable distribution of income and wealth.  The policy 
development process is not a disembodied phenomenon but is nested in an effectively functioning 
institutional setting.  There can be no effective policy development process if institutions are ineffective, 
dysfunctional and corrupt. The recent experience of developing Asian countries that have successfully found 
pathways to sustainable development, e.g., Thailand, Malaysia among others, shows that it is not sufficient 
to have efficient policies, it is equally, if not more important, to have effective institutions and good 
leadership. A combination of efficient policy, enlightened leadership and competent institutions is 
indispensable to growth and development.  For instance, a country may enact a competition law in support 
of the market economy, which establishes “a framework for promoting the competitive process and 
economic efficiency” (Guasch and Spiller 1999, p. 288) but it will need an effective operational structure to 
enforce the competition law.  In this regard, we may cite recent developments in other countries, which 
created both the policy framework as well as the institutional structure to enforce good policies. Chile 
created the Preventive Commission and the Resolutive Commission, which are both administrative anti-trust 
commissions that enforce competition lawii.  Mexico created the Federal Commission of Competition to 
ensure adherence to competition law.  Peru passed Decree Law 25868 that created the Institute for the 
Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property.  Australia has the Productivity Commission, the Australian 
Government's principal review and advisory body on a broad range of economic and social issues, including 
competition policy, productivity, the environment, economic infrastructure, labor markets, trade and 
assistance, structural adjustment and microeconomic policy and regulation.   
The paper is organized into four sections.  After a brief introduction, section II discusses gaps in 
Philippine policy development process that is brought about by weak governance and institutional 
weaknesses.. The section uses as backdrop a stocktaking of the recent reform experiences in domestic 
shipping and telecommunications to support our thesis that the policy development process requires robust 
institutional regulatory frameworks. Political will and the presence of the right institutions are crucial to move 
forward the development effort. The experience in the telecommunications sector shows a regulatory 
agency that is willing to undertake reforms but is held back by institutional limitations.  The third section 
examines strategic triggers for reform while the final section explores institutions and strategies to support 
the policy development process. 
 
II.  A GOVERNANCE CRISIS 
   26
 
The late Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal coined the term “soft state” to refer to developing 
countries that lack a disciplined and capable bureaucratic culture, a cogent societal fabric, and a strong 
political will to overcome such weakness. As Myrdal put it, a soft state has “deficiencies in legislation and in 
particular law observance and enforcement, a widespread disobedience by public officials on various levels 
to rules and directives handed down to them, and often their collusion with powerful persons and groups of 
persons whose conduct they regulate” (Myrdal, 1970).  In the light of its faltering attempts in policy 
development process, the Philippines easily classifies as a soft state under this definition.  Not surprisingly, 
the aspects of a soft state extend over those of a poorly or fairly governed state.  That means there is 
something fundamentally wrong with the way social institutions, set of roles, rules, decision-making 
procedures, and programs that serve to define social practices and guide the interactions of those 
participating in these practices, are established and operated.  
 
Institutions, whether formal or informal, are the means through which authority is exercised in the 
management of resources of the state.  They make up, in other words, the enabling environment.  The 
observable aspects of this environment that are important enough to consider, according to Kaufmann 
(2003), are: (1) the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (voice and external 
accountability and political stability); (2) the capacity of government to formulate and implement policies 
(government effectiveness and regulatory quality) and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for institutions 
that govern interaction among citizens (rule of law  and control of corruption).  
 
While regulatory quality looks at the policies themselves, i.e., at the incidence of market-unfriendly 
policies as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation, government effectiveness 
focuses on “inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and implement sound policies and 
deliver public goods.  These inputs include the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, 
the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies.  
 
Rule of law measures the confidence and success of a society in developing an environment in 
which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions.  Rule of law means the 
existence of checks and balances, regular and predictable regime succession, a formally independent 
judiciary, among others.  It measures the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, the enforceability 
of contracts, and even the perceptions of the incidence of crime. Theory suggests that systems governed by 
the formal rule of law are likely to perform better than those in which rules may be arbitrarily changed (North, 
1990). 
 
On these counts of governance, the Philippines has received vulnerable marks suggesting that the 
country, which faces very serious development challenges, risks  being ineffectually managed and being 
transformed into a failed state.  In 2004, the Philippines got a 32.7 percentile rating on the rule of law, 12.3 
on political stability, 50.2 in government effectiveness, 34.8 in control of corruption, 47.3 in regulatory quality 
and 48.3 in voice and accountabilityiii.  The score denotes weak government capacity to produce and 
implement good policies and deliver public goods, unsatisfactory legal and regulatory frameworks, less than 
satisfactory observance of the rule of law and middling attempts to combat corruption.  The mediocre 
governance performance is dimmed by political instability, with the World Bank suggesting that the score 
placed the Philippines in a state of “governance crisis”.   
 
Although the country experienced a modest improvement in almost all governance indicators 
(except Voice and Accountability) in 2005 compared to 2004, historical trends from 1996 reveal that the 
overall quality of Philippine governance has declined (Figure 1)iv.  The score lends itself to pessimistic 
reading of the Philippine development experience and expectations for the future unless drastic action is 
taken by the political leaders to improve the quality of Philippine governance. Political stability and the rule   27
of law showed the largest decline in the country’s score, dropping from a 34 and 53.6 percentile score, 
respectively, in 1996 to 17.5 and 38.6 in 2005.  Philippine rule of law, which measures among others the 
country’s capacity to enforce contracts and the quality of its police and courts, is rated poor.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Governance Indicators of the Philippines 1996-2005 
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Source:  Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2006:  Governance Indicators for 1996-2006 
 
 
  The dismal state of Philippine governance is made more apparent when compared with other 
ASEAN countries.  The country’s percentile score in almost all governance indicators for 2005 indicate that 
the Philippines always comes out in between the scores of the its more affluent neighbors (Singapore, 
Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand) and the emerging economies (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos).  Figure 2 
shows that in almost all governance indicators in 2005, the Philippines has not been up to par with the more 
developed nations in the ASEAN.  This highlights the precariousness, vulnerability and mediocrity of 
governance in the Philippines. 
 
Figure 2.  Governance Indicators in the ASEAN region, 2005  












Source:  Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2006:  Governance Indicators for 1996-2006 
 
 
Existing institutions and governance quality (“context” as used here) have a profound impact on 
reform efforts. They shape the way the interests of actors are aggregated and shaped. Context also 
determines the degree of complementarity between new and existing institutions, which ascertains how 
likely effective and sustainable the institutions will be (Fritzen, 2006)..   
 
 
The literature suggests that struggles over institutional redesign involve conflict among powerful 
institutional factions. Each actor will assess his or her degree of support or resistance to any changes in   31
institutional rules based on how his or her power and resource accumulation strategy are enhanced or 
diminished by these changes (Fritzen, 2005).  
 
In Philippine political economy, the different factions and vested groups, which are in conflict, have 
their origins in the political and economic power of the economic elite. The power center is a centralized 
presidency that orchestrates the execution of policy and allocation of spoils. Such concentration of power at 
the top blends with the decentralized power of families and clans, within the context of a “neo-patrimonial” 
political system (Azfar, et.al., 2000). The flow of power is from regional elites to central state authorities 
(Franco, 2000). The national electoral system, which is nominally competitive (incumbency does not assure 
re-election---Franco (2000)), is a curious set of first-past-the-post contests, and mainly yields the president, 
senators and local-council (sanggunian) representatives who are elected at large, as well as Congress 
members elected from geographic constituencies (along with a small number elected from party lists). The 
need to share the spoils of political victory often incites a scramble by politicians across parties to join the 
winning presidential candidate’s party (Azfar, et.al., 2000). 
 
Because the president has discretion over disbursement and big-ticket government contracts, 
licensing authority, and fiscal management powers---a pattern appropriated from the American presidential 
system---politicians have to ally themselves with the chief executive to ensure funding for key projects and a 
major share in the patronage resources of the government.  In turn, in the absence of effective political 
parties, the president has to count on local elites for electoral support and mobilization.  As a result, local 
elites can leverage local power effectively during elections and, in-between, ask for major concessions, 
through the Congress, from the central government (Rocamora, 1995).  The leverage that the chief 
executive has on local politicians is matched by the leverage that local politicians have in their ability to 
collect votes from their local bases of power (Igaya, 1999). 
 
This local-central symmetry is perpetuated when Congress members routinely engage in party 
switching to bolster the ranks of the ruling party in successive elections, a practice which in turn stiffens the 
lack of any real programmatic or ideological separation among Philippine political parties (Franco, 2000). 
One result of this system is that the Philippine legislature by and large does not mediate differing interests; 
its policies, laws and resource priorities are seen widely as directly favoring powerful constituencies 
(Gonzalez and Mendoza, 2002). The Philippine legislature is thus, orientated toward a spoils systems 
designed to entrench the incumbents’ political and economic power rather than a system to balance and 
reward competing interests in society with a view to upholding the welfare of the those with neither political 
nor economic welfarepower.  Also, minorities have little voice (other than as local majorities), especially in 
national politics (Azfar, et.al., 2000). As suggested by De Dios and Ferrer (2001) as well as Mendoza 
(2001), these political contests for control of resources are quite intense since the state “disposes over a 
significant amount of resources and exercises discretion over a wide sphere.” More often than not, 
politicians themselves design and modify institutions to stay in power.   Voting arrangements, constitutional 
rules, financing of campaigns and political parties, and other institutions are maintained or revised to keep 
incumbents in office. Horrendous policies and institutions can be best understood from the perspective of 
entrenching the incumbents (Djankov, et al., 2002).  
 
Various interpretations of Philippine political economy commonly suggest the likelihood of “capture” 
of the state and its instrumentalities by vested interests based on political clans (De Dios and Esfahani, 
2001). Public agencies serve as conduits for capture of both policies and public resources.  State capture 
implies that corruption is not always merely a sideshow; instead, the very political and economic forces 
associated with capture play a pivotal role in shaping policies and political economy outcomes (Kaufmann 
and Kraay, 2005) in the process blurring the separation between public duties and private interests.  When 
economic and political forces are closely aligned, the very actors which must adopt and implement policies   32
to curb corruption may face weak, or even negative incentives to do so---all the more so when institutional 
rules of the game affect resource accumulation strategies (Fritzen, 2006). 
 
Yet, for all its weaknesses, the Philippines may still be far from being a failed state.  After all, a 
mediocre score is still a conditional passing mark. To slip into the status of a failed state, institutions have to 
collapse dramatically, something that seems unlikely to happen in the Philippines.  But that score precisely 
puts the country in a middling status, unable to soar but risks going under unless radical institutional and 
policy reforms are introduced and unless the political leadership aligns itself with the common good and 
welfare of the country.  Thus, the country has little choice but to push reforms much harder than usual to 
break out of this crippling bind. To do nothing is to sow the seeds of a failed state. 
 
 
Regulatory capture and expropriation 
 
Regulatory agencies are a point of political access for purchasing major influence over government 
policy.  Arguably, major regulators are the focus of demands to align governmental preferences with the 
interests of firms and individuals seeking (or maintaining) influence over public policy. Regulatory capture 
also suggests purchase of laws and policies to get both the legal framework and the policymaking process 
out of shape---in a systematic striving for concentrated rents. Captor firms seek to shop for privileges a la 
carte directly from the state---such as individualized protection of their initially weaker property rights (World 
Bank, 2000). Effectively representation in the regulatory process could cause regulators to allow incumbent 
firms to earn excess profits, perhaps as a reward for cross-subsidizing select users (such as government 
officials).  Regulatory capture has encoded advantages in both old and new rules and institutions for narrow 
vested interests. In effect, the Philippines, as a rent state, has generated a market for rules (Fabella, 1999), 
with the ‘products’ such as laws, rules, policies, regulations and even legal interpretation going to the 
highest bidder. 
 
Expropriation, on the other hand, arises due to collective action initiatives.  Political intervention is 
often biased in favor of organized groups. In general, expropriation can arise if (1) user groups are well-
organized in the regulatory process, and cause service to be provided below cost, and (2) an election may 
cause political pressure to be placed on regulators to favor users against suppliers (Noll, 1999).   
 
Experience in the Philippines shows the extent and potential deleterious effects of expropriation 
and political intervention.  The Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) created a Wholesale Electricity 
Spot Market (WESM), designed to be one of the most advanced electricity markets in the world, created 
incentive problems in which government’s policy ultimately favored certain groups.  In order to attract wide 
participation in the WESM, government has opened the door for the involvement of electric cooperatives 
(ECs).  To ensure the quality of participating ECs, government has set out prudential requirements under 
the WESM rules that must be achieved.  However, most ECs lack the financial and technical capability to 
trade in the envisioned market. They would need to be strengthened or restructured to be able to participate 
in the WESM.  However, buckling under intense pressure and lobbying, Congress inserted Section 60 in the 
EPIRA law and the government wrote Rule 31 in the accompanying implementing rules and regulations 
(IRR) to condone the debts of these cooperatives subject to the provisions stipulated in the mentioned 
statute to help them achieve financial viability.  Not only may this provision be unsustainable since NEA, 
acting as the guarantor of these ECs, has its own attendant financial problems, it also creates the wrong 
incentives for defaulting debtors such as those electric cooperatives.  It is, thus, doubtful whether debt 
condonation could  improve the efficiency and financial capability of these ECs.  The World Bank (2004) 
notes that the poor credit rating of some ECs will also be a barrier to their participation in WESM.  
 
 Another example is the issue of cross-ownership of generation and distribution utilities.  
Patalinghug and Llanto (2005) showed the flaw in the cross-ownership provision in the EPIRA.  It allows a   33
company or related group to own, operate, or control 30% percent of the installed generating capacity of a 
grid and/or 25% percent of the national installed generating capacity. This provision opens up the possibility 
for a distribution company to enter into supply contracts with its generation subsidiaries, and create hidden 
profits for the conglomerate. The deleterious effect of cross-ownership has been cited in the popular press. 
MERALCO has been accused of buying power from its affiliated IPPs at higher prices compared to the price 
charged by the NPCv. However, MERALCO asserts that it sources about 55% percent of its total power 
supply from the NPC, and that its IPP rates would decrease per kilowatt hour if the plants would be 
dispatched at minimum energy quantity (MEQ) or the maximum contracted outputs of about 83 to 86% 
percent of their installed capacities. 
 
All regulatory processes are inherently conflict-ridden, and participants in the regulatory process 
seek to influence that process to their own advantage by using all means available to them. Influence is 
exercised  through a variety of approaches: (a) submitting information to regulators that supports a favorable 
decision, (b) seeking intervention by political allies, and (c) finding mechanisms for protection against highly 
unfavorable outcomes, among others. 
 
The choice of and successful implementation of reform initiatives will depend to a great extent on 
whether an enabling or constraining policy environment is created, on whether or not effective institutions 
are present and finally, on whether or not incentives for change are at hand. This requires assessing 
political culture, as it relates to the way authority is exercised, and the extent to which power is deployed 
across different institutions. Pinpointing where the discretion is would be a significant step in breaking the 
links between money and influence, and reversing regulatory capture. Political finance goes to the heart of 
the country’s political culture. This is antithetical to the culture of governance which is invariably linked to 
accountability.  Governance and accountability’s goal is to destroy patron-client structures and replace them 
with explicit and transparent rules and norms of conduct.  
 
In the end, poor development outcomes reflect inadequacies in institutional structures and weak 
governance. To be sure, the patron-client structures in the Philippine political system have conditioned the 
responses of the political actors to policy development, and, thus, set the stage for policy failure.  To a 
significant degree, this lack of enduring success in governance has resulted in poor development outcomes.  
It seems that the country’s political managers have opted for weak institutions---unstable regulatory 
formations, a “market for rules”, agencies that are vulnerable to regulatory capture---to meet their personal 
strategic objectives. This suggests the critical importance not only of policy reforms but also of fostering 
effective institutions and good governance in altering the course of Philippine development. 
 
 
Stocktaking: attempts to improve in regulatory and institutional frameworksvi 
 
  This section discusses the recent policy development process in domestic shipping, and 
telecommunicationsvii.  The initial policy reform efforts in the telecommunications sector by the Ramos 
administration gained ground and eventually have been sustained up to the present time.  The drive for a 
better policy environment in the telecommunications sector created a positive response from investors and 
consumers alike, which have become strong constituency for reforms.  There is a tangible wave of 
investments by various players in the information and communications technology industry. On the other 
hand, both the Aquino and Ramos administrations initiated critical policy reforms in the inter-island shipping 
industry but under succeeding administrations, the reform initiative appeared to slow down in the last few 
years.  High shipping costs have stalled the drive for competitiveness, trade and growth.  Worse, passenger 
safety continues to be compromised by the failure to meet safety regulations and minimum service 
standards in domestic seafaring vessels. 
 
Lack of competition despite deregulation   34
 
Deregulation made headway in several strategic industries such as oil, telecommunications, air 
transport, inter-island shipping, banking and insurance. Government ownership or control of these 
“commanding heights” of the economy was privatized fully or partially in industries such as iron and steel, 
fertilizers, telecommunications and banking.  These reforms led to improvements in the policy environment 
and introduced competition in the local economy but the gains and improvements in some industries paled 
in comparison with the promises that were trumpeted.  The country’s experience in the deregulation of ports 
and shipping illustrates this apparent failure of deregulation and liberalization to spur competition and 
growth.  In particular, this paper will use the case of the ports and shipping sector to exemplify how 
government deregulation policy fell short of expectations in inducing competition. 
 
Considering the archipelagic setting of the Philippines, shipping provides the primary means of 
inter-island commerce and transport.  Long before the Spaniards came to colonize the islands, the natives 
relied on primitive shipping transport for trade, commerce and movement among the many islands of the 
archipelago.  Trade with Chinese and Arab merchants flourished because of the relatively more advanced 
shipping transport of their respective countries of origin.  Because the bulk of domestic trade and inter-island 
transport, especially in the Visayas and Mindanao relies on shipping, sustaining policy reform initiatives in 
inter-island liner shipping is very critical.  The shipping industry contributed about half a percent to gross 
domestic product during the nineties.   Passenger traffic on liner shipping increased from almost 30 million 
passengers in 1990 to 44 million in 2000.  The volume of domestic cargo went up from 58 million metric tons 
in 1990 to 76.9 million metric tons in 2000.  Transit cargoes (import and export cargoes) grew from 597.5 
thousand metric tons in 1991 to 757.3 thousand metric tons in 1998.       
   
The regulatory authority for shipping is the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), an agency 
attached to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).  Created under Presidential 
Decree No. 474 in 1974, it is mandated to provide supervision, regulation and rationalization of the 
organizational management, ownership, and operations of all water transport utilities, and other maritime 
enterprises.  Before the reforms were instituted, its mandate included the regulation of inter-island rates, 
regulation of entry/routes and regulation of safety and service standards. All sea-borne carriers and shipping 
companies, including those in logistics, are regulated by MARINA. The provision of navigation facilities, as 
well as of maritime communication facilities, has been assumed directly by DOTC. Another agency involved 
in shipping is the Philippine Coast Guard, which is responsible for policing and safety enforcement. 
 
MARINA exercises its regulatory functions through the issuance of a certificate of public 
conveyance (CPC), which informs route and safety regulation.  At present, there are 694 cargo routes being 
served by the domestic inter-island shipping industry. To operate on any given route, a shipping company 
has to secure a permit from MARINA.  For a long time, MARINA has subscribed to the ”prior operator” rule, 
i.e., by raising the hurdle on the entry of a second operator on a route. It required proof of enough traffic to 
warrant the operation of another carrier.  The obvious intent was to avoid “destructive competition”. In 1994, 
reforms liberalized entry into routes: presumption of need was deemed in favor of the prospective entrant, 
while the existing operator has the burden of proof that a proposed service is not needed. Routes were 
opened to at least two shipping operators. To encourage entry in developmental or new routes, the 
pioneering operator was given protection for a period of 5 years.  
 
This was re-iterated under Memorandum Circular No. 106 (1995) that opened all monopoly routes 
with 5-year history to a second operator, and allowed rates different from the fork rates to be imposed by 
vessels with new technological features.  Thus, the government limited the protection of operators in 
missionary or developmental routes from new entrants to only five years in contrast to the pre-reform 
regulation giving protection to the incumbent operator for an indefinite period, i.e., until it has recovered its 
investment.  Operators can also replace old vessels with bigger ones to increase capacity, increase the 
frequency of port calls, change routes or introduce a new route under certain conditions.   35
 
MARINA revised the 5-year period for protecting pioneer operators in developmental routes to 
include certain conditions.  The implementing guidelines of Executive Order No. 185 were revised under 
Memorandum Circular No. 161 in 2000. New entrants can ply these routes for as long as their entry will not 
result in ruinous competition.  Entry was not allowed when existing operators in a given route carry less than 
the average annual break-even load as determined by MARINA.  This will be MARINA’s stance when 
audited financial statements of any of the operators in a given route show losses directly related to their 
operation for the last two years or when such other analogous circumstances exist.  
 
With the exception of third class passenger fares and specific non-containerized basic commodities 
whose rates are set by MARINA, all other passenger fares and cargo rates have been deregulated. Whether 
there are one or multiple operators on any route, MARINA took a hands-off policy on rates (except for third 
class passenger fares and basic commodities). Cargo rates are set by negotiation between the shipping 
company and the cargo owner.  
Thus, in the nineties, the Ramos administration issued two executive orders, namely, Executive 
Order No. 185, which de-monopolized shipping routes and Executive Order No. 213, which deregulated 
passage and freight/cargo rates (except for non-containerized basic commodities).  Deregulation and 
liberalization were a slow process as it took government 10 long years to introduce those reforms. 
 
The deregulation of passenger and freight rates was finally made a permanent policy under a 
recently enacted law (RA 9295 - “An Act Promoting the development of Philippine Domestic Shipping, 
Shipbuilding, and Ship Repair/Breaking, ordaining reforms in government policies towards shipping in the 
Philippines, and for other purposes”). The law lifted the regulations on the shipping industry by allowing the 
shipping companies to fix their own rates.  It also provided tax and other incentives to encourage the 
modernization of the industryviii.  
 
While the new law allows shipping companies to establish their own rates, the law’s Implementing 
Rules and Regulations (IRR) introduced certain conditions to protect public interest, namely: (a) 
development of routes (entry) to promote competition; (b) MARINA intervention in rate-setting under certain 
conditions; and (c) right of shippers to question/challenge rate increases.  MARINA issued Memorandum 
Circular No. 153 (which revised the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 213) 
removing the Consultative Council (DOSCON) which was organized by liners to provide themselves a 
venue for discussing proposed rate increases.  The only requirement is publication of proposed rate 
increase in newspapers of general circulation.  Subsequently, RA 9295 repealed MARINA M.C. No. 153.  
Under Section 4 of the IRR, MARINA, through the Administrator, shall intervene pursuant to the Rules on 
Summary Procedure as prescribed in Marina M.C. 74-A which includes the conduct of public hearings and 
consultations.   
 
The de-monopolization of shipping routes was intended to increase competition. However, it seems that 10 
years after the de-monopolization of shipping routes, 50% and 70% of primary and secondary/tertiary 
routes, respectively, have remained a monopolistic market. There is lack of effective competition in routes 
even where there are two or more operators.ix  Calculations made by Austria (2002) show that the domestic 
shipping industry is highly concentrated, with the five largest operators accounting for 90% of total number 
of passenger traffic.  Less than five out of the 37 operators plying primary and secondary routes are 
effectively competing.  There is in fact a claim by the Distribution Management Association of the Philippines 
that domestic shipping liners operate in a cartel-like fashionx.  Table 1 provides an insight into the state of 
competition in cargo service based on available data (1998).  Table 2 shows the state of competition in 
passenger travel. 
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Table 1.  State of Competition in Cargo Service, 1998 
Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
Route Classification 
No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
Routes with only 1 operator  25  36.2  16  34.8  444  76.7 
Routes with at least 2 operators  44  63.8  30  65.2  135  23.3 
 - Routes with effectively 1 operator  7  10.1  9  19.6  39  6.7 
 - Routes with substantial competition  10  14.5  6  13.0  38  6.5 
 - Routes with mild competition  27  39.1  15  32.6  58  10.0 
Total Number of Routes  69    46    579   
Source:  M. Austria. Philippine Domestic Shipping Industry (2002) 
 
 
Table 2.   State of Competition in Passenger Travel, 1998 
Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
Route Classification 
No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
Routes with only 1 operator  26  50.0  27  58.7  166  77.6 
Routes with at least 2 operators  26  50.0  19  41.3  48  22.4 
 - Routes with effectively 1 operator  5  9.6  7  15.2  10  4.7 
 - Routes with substantial competition  7  13.5  6  13.0  18  8.4 
 - Routes with mild competition  14  26.9  6  13.0  20  9.3 
Total Number of Routes  52    46    214   
Source:  M. Austria. Philippine Domestic Shipping Industry (2002) 
 
  MARINA contends that the presence of high-speed crafts in a number of ferry and developmental 
routes indicates an improvement in shipping service competition.  Austria (2002) notes, however, that the 
profitability of the high-speed craft industry may be difficult to sustain. The study pointed out that these crafts 
are inappropriate, given the country’s current level of development, because they generally cater to the A-B 
crowd or those belonging to high-income group of the society. Domestic sea passengers come mostly from 
the low-income groups. These high-speed crafts are good only for short distance travel but then again most 
passengers in these routes are C-D crowd and a few businessmen who travel to places not within the reach 
of air transport. Thus, this type of vessel does not seem to adequately address the outstanding need of the 




  Another major policy issue is the crucial importance of ensuring that seafaring vessels meet 
adequate service standards and safety regulations.  From 1995 to 2002, there were on average 162 
maritime accidents and 215 fatalities per annum. Sigua and Aguilar (2003) reported that from 1991-2000, 
the four most frequent causes of maritime accidents were: capsizing (30%), sinking (25%), grounding 
(21%), and engine trouble (12%). The casualty figures were also very high – averaging 118 fatalities and 
152 missing persons on an annual basisxi. A similar report was done by the Transnational Diversified Group, 
under the assistance of JICA, in 2003 also indicating high numbers for the same causes of maritime 
accidents.  The JICA report show that the three categories mentioned above account for about 58 percent of 
all maritime accidents.  Poor vehicle maintenance, overloading and disregard of safety regulations are 
contributory factors to the high rate of maritime accidents.  MARINA has taken steps to ensure the 
seaworthiness of seafaring vessels, e.g., condition of the hull, engine, navigational instruments, firefighting 
equipment, life-saving requirements, and others, and to enforce adequate service and safety standards on 
operators but there is much more room for improvement.  MARINA has to develop further its monitoring 
capability to protect consumers from unscrupulous practices of shippers and unnecessary risks brought   37
about by the lack of proper vehicle maintenance or the failure to meet service and safety standards.xiixiii   
Furthermore, given that these accidents involve lack of navigational safety measures such as buoys, 
markers, and designated sea lanes to mark shallow waters, MARINA should actively advocate the 
improvement of these safety measures to diminish the occurrence of these avoidable accidents. 
 
Table 3. Summary of Major Causes and Nature of Maritime Accidents
Causes of Accidents Percent Nature of Accidents Percent
Natural Causes 36
Vessel traffic-related (i.e., collision, 
ramming) 27.5
Big waves and strong winds 59 Capsizing 19.1
Typhoon 35 Sinking  16.6
Human Error 24 Grounding 13.8
Negligence in duties 18.3
Vessel performance-related (i.e., 
engine trouble, ship damage 8.1
Defective equipment/engine trouble 16.1
Source: Transnational Diversified Group (2003)
 
 
The government should continue and expand deregulation efforts.  Under previous regulations, 
third class passenger service is not deregulated.  Shipping companies complain that the regulated rates are 
so low that costs can not be covered.  Those regulations also require them to allocate 50% of the vessels’ 
passenger capacity to third class passengers, mostly coming from the lower income groups.  Although these 
regulations are somehow being superseded by RA 9295 and its IRR by deregulating third class passenger 
service and canceling the 50% imposition of capacity to third class passengers, the challenge of lack of 
investments in seaworthy vehicles that meet safety regulations and minimum service standards must 
nevertheless be met.  Moreover, the failure to provide adequate transport and shipping service to the lower 
income groups still remains to be an unsolved problem.   Thus, the government has to review the situation 
very carefully to find out what deters private investments in this sector. 
 
  Finally, the country has to face the challenge of finding the best option for dealing with high domestic 
shipping costs.  The reported high cost of shipping has negative implications for the overall efficiency, 
competitiveness and growth of the Philippines. Inefficient port and shipping services reduce the potential 
income of farmers and producers.  Although there may be exogenous factors which increase shipping costs, 
such as high fuel cost, the government has to take a closer look at the discouraging impact of high interest 
rates, high insurance premiums, high taxes and lack of comparable government support programs for the 
domestic shipping industry. High fuel costs are really determined by the vicissitudes of the international 
market.  However, high interest rates and high insurance premiums apparently reflect the inefficiency of the 
domestic shipping sector which may be improved with a comprehensive and workable competition policy.  
Providing government support to the development of the domestic shipping industry is something that is 
within the scope of MARINA advocacy. 
 
The competition to be given by foreign vessels, which could service Philippine ports once the 
cabotage law has been lifted, appears to be an attractive solution to high shipping costs.xiv  Foreign 
competition will motivate greater efficiency in the shipping industry, which will bring down shipping costs.xv  
The question is will the government have the nerve to further liberalize the shipping industry? Does MARINA 
have adequate and credible regulatory willingness and capacity to ensure competition in the domestic 
shipping market and to enforce safety and service standards? 
 
Recent efforts by MARINA   38
 
Attempts have been made by MARINA to be an institution responsive to the needs of the domestic 
shipping industry.  The following have been provided by MARINA to show recent efforts for the improvement 
of the industry: 
 
1.  RA 9295 deregulated fare setting with the objective of keeping tariff competitive and 
affordable.  MARINA, though, still retains intervention power supposedly to protect and 
safeguard the interest of the general public. 
2.  The quasi-judicial functions of MARINA are now governed by RA 9295 and its IRR.  
Efforts have been made in simplifying franchising requirements and procedures by 
dispensing with the tedious requirement and procedures provided in the Public Service 
Act (PSA) and related MARINA Circulars.  Entry to routes has been liberalized and the 
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) is now issued to the shipping operator/company 
to provide greater flexibility to them and to achieve optimum utilization fo their fleet. 
3.  The law also provides the necessary assistance and incentives for the continued growth 
and modernization of the Philippine domestic merchant fleet. 
4.  The current effort of the DOTC, MARINA, PPA and DBP in jointly implementing the RO-
RO Terminal System (RRTS) can be seen, not only in terms of promoting fleet 
modernization, but also in paving the way for a seamless travel crucial to facilitate the 
agro-tourism link among the islands.  It is seen as a step closer towards the concrete 
realization of inter-modal transport. 
5.  Even as a liberalized and conducive environment is being fostered by the government for 
vessel acquisitions and operations, MARINA has simultaneously given its serious 
attention to the improvement of maritime safety in domestic operations, especially in the 
light of the numerous maritime accidents that have been occurring through the years.  
Government programs in this regard were essentially guided by the need to address the 
attendant concerns related to vessel seaworthiness, the need to insure crew competence, 
and the provision of essential aids-to-navigation. 
6.  The decision of MARINA to adopt and implement the International Management Code for 
the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Convention (ISM Code) for domestics ships 
required to be classed according to certain sizes through the issuance of Flag State 
Administration Advisory No. 8 and MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 159, is one of the 
serious efforts to foster  and enhance maritime safety culture and environmental 
protection. 
7.  As part also of continuing efforts to foster a systematic, uniform and effective conduct of 
ship safety inspection of all registered domestic ships, MARINA formulated and adopted 
the Ship Safety Inspection System (SSIS) through the issuance of Memorandum Circular 
No. 203. 
 
These are steps in the right direction and MARINA should continue to implement reforms and 
ensure competition in the shipping sector.  The Medium Term Philippine Development Plan of 1999-2004 
has long recognized the needed institutional and policy reforms in the ports and shipping sectors.  Indeed, 
the question is not what reforms to make but whether and when those reforms will ever be made and 
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  During the pre-reform period situation, service coverage represented only 16% of total land area. 
Barely half a million telephone lines serviced a population of 60 million people. Distribution of services 
between rural and urban areas was unbalanced.  The government’s reform efforts, which started earnestly 
during the Ramos administration, have born fruit: more industry participants in all market segments, an 
increase in telephone penetration rates, an improvement in service quality, introduction of value-added 
services and a reduction in telecommunications costs as the industry regulator, the National 
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) continues to pursue reform efforts.  The World Bank (2005) reports 
sector revenues for 2002 of Pesos 145 billion, an annual growth rate of 7.2% estimated for the following 
three years.  Cellular mobile users grew from 12.1 million in 2001 to 32.9 million in 2004.  This makes the 
telecommunications sector a major source of economic growth   
 
The Ramos administration issued Executive Order 59 mandating the compulsory interconnection of 
authorized public telecommunications carriers in order to create a universally accessible and fully integrated 
nationwide telecommunications network. Subsequently, President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 109, 
which required all cellular mobile telecommunications services (CMTS) operators to install at least 400,000 
telephone lines within three years, and international gateway facility (IGF) operators to put up 300,000 lines 
within five years. The Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines (R.A. 7925) was passed in 
1995 to promote and govern the development of the telecommunications industry and to improve the 
delivery of telecommunications services.  R.A. 7925 addressed the need for an established policy 
framework in the telecommunications industry.  It also laid down the foundation for the administration, 
conduct, and direction of the telecommunications industry. Republic Act 7925 mandated the privatization of 
government-owned and operated telecommunications facilities, while deregulating rate and tariff setting, 
and removing the 12% percent cap on rate of return.   
 
Value-added services (VAS) were also deregulated. A VAS provider that does not set up its own 
network and relies solely on the transmission, switching and local facilities of enfranchised telephone 
companies does not need to secure a franchise in order to operate. It only needs to register with the NTC 
(Kim, 2003).  NTC has recently issued a Memorandum stating that Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) is a 
“value-added service” and that it is an enhanced (telecommunications) service beyond those ordinarily 
provided for by local exchange and inter-exchange operators, and overseas carriers”.xvi  VOIP enables 
users to engage in voice conversations without having to pass through the international gateway facilities of 
telephone companies which charge much higher fees for the use of their networks.  The NTC explains that 
“VOIP does not merely involve converting and reassembling voice to and from data packets at the points of 
transmission and destination.  VOIP technology offers far more advanced and different service attributes 
than traditional voice services. VOIP is an advanced communications application that can converge (sic) 
voice communications seamlessly with other digital applications”. 
 
            The bold decision of the Ramos administration de-monopolized the telecommunications industry.  It 
does not mean however, that ”no single operator today is able to exercise considerable market power” 
(Serafica 2001).  The NTC regulates end-user rates but access charge is negotiated between 
interconnecting carriers.  Republic Act 7925 provides that the rates of interconnection must take into 
account the following (Article III, Section 18): 
•  The costs of the facilities needed to complete the interconnection 
•  The need to provide the cross subsidy to local exchange carriers to enable them to fulfill the 
primary national objective of increasing telephone density in the country, and 
•  Assurance of a rate of return on the total local exchange network investment that is at parity with 
those earned by other segments of the telecommunications industry.   
 
Serafica (2001) noted that the actual level and structure of access charge differ, depending on the 
type of interconnecting service.  In theory, an incumbent is reluctant to give access to other entrants 
supplying the same product. If there is intense competition between incumbents and new entrants,   40
interconnection agreements are less likely because of divergent interests. Under these circumstances, 
access regulation must be quite forceful (Valletti and Estache, 1999). Unfortunately, Republic Act 7925 has 
no explicit or forceful rules on access regulation. Instead it specifies that access charges and sharing 
arrangements between all interconnecting carriers shall be negotiated between the parties. Clear and 
explicit rules would have made the regulation credible. It is now up to the NTC, the regulatory body to issue 
rules and regulations to ensure that the incumbent does not exercise its market power to the detriment of 
other entrants and ultimately, of the consumers. There seems to be scope for the NTC to make access 
regulation more efficient and forceful instead of leaving interconnection to the involved parties to negotiate.  
The law has supported the entry of new players but this is not enough. There is a need for clear and forceful 
competition rules to ensure fair competition and uphold consumer welfare.  In the post-reform era, PLDT, 
the dominant player, still wields incumbency advantages because of its control of the telecommunications 
backbone facility.   
 
According to the NTC, four trends are visible in the telecommunications market today: 
•  Several providers have emerged dominant and financially viable in the submarkets, while the 
market shares of the other providers have been reduced to almost insignificant levels. These other 
providers are, thus, unable to compete against the dominant providers. For instance, In 2004, the 
two largest service providers had a combined net income of Pesos 39.2 billion as compared to the 
net loss of Pesos 2.3 billion of the next two largest carriers. 
•  The precarious financial condition of non-dominant providers is less a consequence of the 
smallness of their subscribers’ base than a product of unregulated price squeezing behavior of the 
dominant providers. 
•  Horizontally integrated providers are engaged in cross-subsidization to stem the churn out from 
fixed to mobile services, to the detriment of non-integrated providers. 
•  Large providers appear to be leveraging their control of the last mile into the unregulated value-
added service market. 
 
These trends point to the core of market competition problem in the industry today– the hitherto 
unchecked behavior by some dominant providers of leveraging the power that they hold in one market into 
another and the increase in concentration ratio in the local exchange market rising from 70% in 1999 to 75% 
in 2004, and in the cellular market, from 85% to 96% for the same periodxvii.   
 
The NTC has acknowledged that the the next generation policy reforms would focus on the 
following: (a) imposition of significant market power obligations; (b) policy to unbundle network elements; (c) 
policy allowing resale of services; and (d) policy enforcing ex-post regulation of prices. However, the 
absence of a competition law seems to constrain the NTC from taking a proactive stance in matters 
affecting the state of market competition.  Nevertheless, the NTC has recently issued a policy document on 
the imposition of significant market power obligations (SMP), in a bid to introduce competition rules in the 
sector.  In a nutshell, SMP will make dominant service providers comply with more stringent  ex ante 
regulatory requirements to foreclose opportunities for abuse of market power.  Once the threat of exercise of 
market power is minimized, detailed monitoring of the actual conduct of dominant providers becomes 
unnecessary. Imposing ex-ante obligations, therefore, reduces the need for regulatory intervention over the 
longer termxviii.  Already, the dominant players have made threatening noises of mounting a legal challenge 
to the announced SMP policy.  It remains to be seen whether NTC will have the political will to maintain its 
chosen market-friendly course.  
 
 
Binding institutional constraints and likely sources of institutional resistance 
 
   MARINA faces the difficult task of instituting compliance with safety regulations and minimum 
service standards, and at the same time, supporting policy reforms that will spur more competition and bring   41
down high shipping costs, e.g., issue of the cabotage law, policy on merger and consolidation to ensure 
efficient service to the public. The top leadership of MARINA is composed of political appointees who serve 
at the pleasure of the President of the Philippines.xix  The issue is whether reform efforts in MARINA or any 
other government agency or corporation can be better served by managers who are political appointees or 
by career bureaucrats.  It is well-known that even middle level managers, e.g., directors are political 
appointees as well whose careers are dependent on their ability to please their political patrons.  This issue 
is crucial for the continuity of reforms.  
  The practice in the Philippines of having top and middle-level bureaucrats/officials serving ”at the 
pleasure” of the appointing party, i.e., the President of the country, has contributed to the weakening of 
regulatory frameworks and the growing low credibility of institutions.  The lack of job security or tenure and 
the threat of reprisal from politicians if their whims and caprices are not given due course, have been 
contributory factors to the inadequacy and weaknesses of Philippine institutions. There is nothing in the 
Philippine system of governance and civil service that can shield officials and employees from political 
interference or reprisal. The end-product of such a weak and corrupted system is mediocre performance, 
flawed policies, failure to deliver development outcomes, and worse, corruption. 
The heavy task of regulation of the telecommunications sector falls on the shoulder of NTC. The 
advent of new technologies and new applications widens the scope for competition and emergence of more 
efficient providers, in effect posing a challenge to incumbents.  Advances in wireless technology has eroded 
the market share of fixed line providers and the rise of broadband services open the sector to convergence 
with deep implications on competition and the regulatory capacity of the regulators.   However, dominant 
players hold considerable economic power and political influence which could stymie the reforming zeal of 
NTC. 
   
The NTC commissioners serve ”at the pleasure” of the appointing party, the President of the 
Philippines, and are not tenured. Thus, the three NTC commissioners are not shielded from political 
interference, which may create problems about the credibility of the regulatory body.  On the other hand, to 
its credit, NTC has recently demonstrated that it could be a pro-active policy formulating and implementing 
body. Its position on VOIP as ”value-added service” has created wide opportunities for the deployment of 
VOIP which will reduce telecommunications costs.  NTC needs to strengthen its capacity in the areas of 
policy and planning, setting telecom tariffs, and technical know-how to adopt and implement standards of 
reliability and to address customer complaints, particularly in the mobile phone business.  It also has to 
develop better communication capacity in order to create a broad constituency among the population, e.g., 
overseas Filipino workers who benefit from low telecommunication costs, as a shield against political 
intrusion.  Not only must it develop its regulatory capacity, it should also strive for financial autonomy.  NTC 
depends on the government for its budget notwithstanding the fact that it raises substantial revenues from 
its licensing authority. Unfortunately, a bill providing the NTC statutory independence and financial 
autonomy has been languishing in Congress. It seems that politicians prefer the status quo where NTC has 
to beg for its annual budget from self-dealing politicians. Another factor undermines regulatory credibility 
and it is the requirement for telecommunications operators to acquire legislative franchise which “politicizes 
the market entry process unduly” (World Bank 2005, p. 175.).   
 
Measuring up against best-practice benchmarks. 
 
Most new regulatory setups depend on a regulatory agency loosely modeled on North American 
public utility commissions that have developed procedures and credibility over decades (Smith and 
Wellenius, 1999). Basically, this means (1) as much relevant information is presented to the regulators as is 
reasonably feasible, (2) the decision makers are neither homogeneous in their biases nor subject to 
unbalanced external pressure, and (3) neutral arbiters can intervene should an agency make an 
unreasonable decision (courts, or as in Australia, something similar to the Productivity Commission) (Noll, 
1999). To work well, this model of regulation requires certain conditions: a strong administrative tradition,   42
the ability to undertake commitments that endure from one government to the next, and a judiciary that is 
impartial, immune to government and political pressures, and able to make enforceable decisions. It also 
requires substantial professional cadres, capable of handling complex regulatory concepts and processes 
(Smith and Wellenius, 1999).  
 
These suggest, following Noll (1999), the following: (1)  The personnel of regulatory agencies 
should be heterogeneous, and have secure and remunerative careers. The domestic supply of 
professionals to implement a better regulatory system is low and inelastic, however. And there are few 
internationally transferable skills in regulation management. There are also incentive problems: regulators 
may seek to enhance their post-regulation employment by favoring a likely future employer, or, some 
specialized skills of regulators may be obtained or usefully applied only in organizations that actively 
participate in the regulatory process; (2)  The agency can be given independent authority to generate 
information and even resources, and undertake their own investigations and research on technologies. (3) 
The agency can be subject to openness requirements. The agency can be required to conduct all business 
in public, to refrain from secret contacts with either interested parties or political officials, and to release all 
relevant information pertaining to a decision as well as a preliminary indication of the decision it is likely to 
make before the actual decision is made. This is useful for revealing whether the agency's decision is 
biased and unsupported by facts; and (4) Decisions of the agency can be subject to review by another body 
that is freer of representation biases, especially biases affecting participation in the agency's processes, at 
the instigation of anyone who is dissatisfied with a decision. All of these are costly to implement and assume 
the presence of a highly developed “rule of law” that is not yet present in the country. Some safeguards 
plausibly are present and affordable (like the transparency processes), so that a recommendation to 
implement reform along these lines is certainly not out of the question. When good institutional and country 
features are not in place, however, regulatory effectiveness, and therefore sector development, can be 
seriously undermined. 
  
What is a feasible solution, when governance is weak? If the objective is not a successful agency 
but a well-performing sector, alternative measures must be found for establishing a regulatory framework 
that enables better sector performance even when an effective, full-fledged regulatory agency is lacking. 
The World Bank indicates that  the regulatory strategy should include reducing the need for agency 
decisions (accelerate competition; write regulatory rules into licenses, contracts, or laws; keep operators’ 
obligations reasonable, focus licensing on the main operators), enhancing the credibility of regulation (adopt 
open regulatory processes, harness public support, adhere to international commitments) and generating 
maximum impact from scarce professional and financial resources by using them effectively (outsource 
some regulatory tasks and pooling sector knowledge) (Smith and Wellenius, 1999).   
 
It may also be wise to adopt relatively simple “benchmark” systems. The realistic choice is for the 
country to rely on the cost audits and price decisions in another country (which may however create 
problems of reliability and domestic political feasibility) (Smith and Wellenius, 1999) 
 
As an illustration for best practices benchmarks from other countries, we look at other countries’ 
reform experience in different sectors such as telecommunications, power, ports and shipping.  Chile has 
led the way in reform and modernization of the telecommunications sector as the first Latin American 
country to eliminate the state monopoly on telecommunications services. Through progressive legislation, 
reforms that directly affected telecommunications occurred in 1982 and 1985. Before the 1982 reform, 
Chile's telecommunications sector had been dominated by state-owned national companies. Santiago and 
the central part of the country had been served by the Telephone Company of Chile (Compañía de 
Teléfonos de Chile--CTC), a subsidiary of Corfo. The southern part of the country was served by two private 
companies, the National Telephone Company (Compañía Nacional de Teléfonos--CNT) and the Telephone 
Company of Coihaique (Compañía de Teléfonos de Coihaique). Another Corfo subsidiary, the National   43
Telecommunications Enterprise (Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones--Entel), had controlled Chile's 
international telephone service and much of the domestic long-distance service (including Easter Island).  
Following key pricing reforms in 1987, most of the state-owned telecommunications firms were 
privatized during the 1987-89 period. The National Telephone Company of Spain (Telefónica) obtained 
control of CTC, which has been 50 percent privatized. Entel retained its monopolies. By 1991 Chile had 
768,000 telephones. CTC plans called for installing 190,000 new lines in 1992 and investing US$500 million 
in 1993 in expanding and upgrading the telephone network. This would permit the installation of 280,000 
new lines and the replacement of the remaining analog switching systems that were serving 320,000 lines in 
1992. In April 1992, however, Chile's monopoly commission ordered Telefónica to sell its stake in one of the 
two Chilean telephone companies in which it owned shares--CTC and Entel. Telefónica was appealing the 
decision to the Supreme Court.    
The result is that today Chile's telecommunications market is booming. The recent award of two 
Personal Communications Services (PCS) licenses attracted interest by both investors and equipment 
suppliers. 
Sector-specific telecommunications rules in Chile are administered by the Subsecretaría de 
Telecomunicaciones (“SUBTEL”) within the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications.  Some 
regulatory provisions include: (1) the award of licenses to provide telecommunications services on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, (2) technical standards and interconnection obligations, (3) price controls (for retail 
services and interconnection) in insufficiently competitive markets, (4) universal service obligations (phased 
in over time in areas lacking sufficient infrastructure), (5) mandatory access to the customer’s choice of 
long-distance provider (through pre-selection and on a call-by-call basis), and (6) competitive bidding for 
subsidized telecommunications deployment projects in rural and low-income urban areas. Antitrust rules, 
which generally prohibit actions or agreements that seek to hinder free competition in economic activities 
and specifically prohibit the grant of exclusive rights to perform any economic activity, are also applicable to 
telecommunications providers. The antitrust rules are administered by four separate institutions, some 
national and some regional. 
 
  Levels of competition that Chile has accomplished in its long-distance market are impressive, due 
in large part to carrier pre-selection and dial-around access requirements. The mobile market likewise has 
experienced growing competition, spurred by the grant of multiple licenses in the same territories. Internet 
usage also has increased significantly in recent years, probably due to price restrictions imposed on the 
dominant local service provider. Finally, Chile has achieved considerable success in deploying “universal 
service” (a single operating payphone in previously un-served villages) on a cost-effective basis pursuant to 
a competitive bidding mechanism. In the competitive bidding procedure, the lowest-bidding carrier is 
awarded a non-exclusive right to construct the payphones (using the cost-effective technology and project 
design developed by the carrier) and receives the awarded subsidies after completion of the facilities. 
 
  Chile’s approach of allowing carriers operating in one segment of the market to operate in other 
segments of the market through separate subsidiaries and subject to prohibitions on cross subsidization 
seems laudable.  The overall regulatory model, particularly the rule authorizing antitrust authorities to 
determine when market conditions justify eliminating specific price regulations, offers a good compromise 
between coherence and specificity. 
 
In Australia, the 1993 Hilmer Report influenced policymakers to adopt the current Australian 
telecommunications regulatory regime. The Hilmer Report based many of its recommendations on a 
comparative analysis of other regulatory regimes, particularly the New Zealand experience.  Under the 
current regime, general antitrust rules apply to telecommunications carriers. In addition, the antitrust 
regulator, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (“ACCC”), administers a cross-sector   44
access regime requiring access to infrastructure facilities of certain services (pursuant to terms that are 
agreed upon by the parties or arbitrated by the ACCC) where the Minister of Transport and Communications 
makes the following determinations: (1) access to the service would promote competition, (2) it would be 
uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to provide the service, (3) the facility is of national 
significance, (4) access to the service can be provided without undue risk to human health and safety, (5) an 
effective access regime is not already in place, and (6) access to the service is not contrary to the public 
interest. 
 
There are other complementary telecommunications sector-specific rules, but most of these are 
incorporated into the antitrust legislation and administered and implemented by the ACCC. Certain technical 
functions are performed by a new regulatory body, the Australian Communications Authority (“ACA”). The 
ACCC and ACA are required to cooperate in some matters. Like Chile, Australia has introduced some 
measure of competition for the provision of universal service through a program of competitive bidding for 
access to a fund earmarked to provide service outside the main cities. 
 
Australia is credited with achieving varying levels of success in promoting competition in the mobile 
market (spurred in part by mobile number portability), the international services market, the dial-up Internet 
market, and the broadband services market. However, the incumbent Telstra continues to control most of 
the local and long-distance markets. There is also concern about Australia’s procedure for mandating 
access to critical telecommunications facilities. The processes for declaring services subject to access 
requirements and for arbitrating appropriate terms of access are cumbersome and slow, and that access 
prices may be set too low to allow the facilities’ owners to recoup their costs. More generally, however, the 
Australian approach of allocating the  main responsibilities for economic regulation of the 
telecommunications sector to a telecommunications-specific department within a specialized cross-sector 
regulator is commendable. 
 
In the power sector, Chile was likewise a pioneer in the early 1980s with the development of a 
competitive system for electricity generation based on marginal prices.  Prices in this market were not truly 
deregulated (except for the largest consumers who chose to enter into contracts directly with generators) 
but were based in the short-run marginal costs of generators in the system and the associated least cost 
dispatch. Two decades later, policymakers in Chile are discussing the desirability of further de-regulating 
Chile’s wholesale electricity market. In particular, the simulated spot market that is in place today would be 
replaced by a real unregulated spot market in which generators would be free to bid whatever prices they 
choose with competition between generators determining the bids and market clearing prices. One major 
concern that has been raised regarding this spot market deregulation proposal is that the high degree of 
concentration in the generation segment would enable incumbent generators to exercise market power, 
leading to prices far above competitive levels.  That is why in the 1990s the Chilean government embarked 
on a program to reduce concentration through divestiture and the encouragement of competitive entry. 
 
The regulatory framework of the Chilean power sector established in 1982 consists of a number of 
different institutions.  The National Energy Commission (CNE, established in 1978 to advise on long term 
strategy) has responsibility for advising the Minister of Economy on electricity policy, it is also responsible 
for the setting of regulated distribution charges. A Superintendent of Prices of Electricity and Fuels (SEC) 
has responsibility for data collection for the purposes of enforcement and regulation, handling of customer 
complaints and the implementation of service quality fines and customer compensations.  In regulation the 
CNE uses data provided by the SEC on company costs. The law places limits on the number and 
background of civil servants working in the CNE. The Minister of Energy formally imposes the regulated 
tariffs and retains control over the issuing of rationing decrees during periods of drought when there is a 
shortage of hydro-electric generating capacity. The Minister also had responsibility for settling disputes in 
the CDEC board within 120 days, though this was altered in 1999. Currently disputes go to an Arbitration 
Panel (of three experts) which has 30 days to issue a judgment, if this is rejected by the CDEC board then   45
the Minister has 60 days to issue a judgment. The Minister is himself part of a 5 member cabinet council 
which oversees the sector. Merger policy, abuse of dominance and collusion remain within the remit of the 
Office of the National Economic Prosecutor, Chile’s Competition Regulator, which has a regulated utilities 
division. The Fiscalaria can present cases to the Antimonopoly Commission. This Commission has a 
Prevention Commission and a Resolution (or appeals) Commission. Companies have the right to appeal to 
the Supreme Court. This process has been somewhat refined by the 2004 Ley Corta in order to speed up 
the processing of disputes. 
 
Because of these regulatory reforms in place, the performance of the Chilean power sector in 
terms of investments, prices, financial performance of power companies, efficiency, rural electrification, and 
quality of supply have been impressive. 
  
In ports and shipping regulation, Taiwan seems to be a good model to emulate.  The small nation’s 
experience with Kaoshiung draws lessons on good competition and regulation policies translating to 
unprecedented development. The port of Kaohsiung is the world's fifth largest container shipping center and 
processes two-thirds of Taiwan's total import and export volume. It has 118 operating berths, occupying 
26.6 kilometers of port waterline that can simultaneously accommodate up to 155 ships. The port effectively 
manages import, export, and transshipment containers and handles up to 8 million TEUs (twenty-foot 
equivalent container units) annually. Situated at the hub of trade routes linking Northeast and Southeast 
Asia, the development of Kaohsiung Port has stimulated Taiwan’s prosperity.   Kaohsiung Port container 
terminals provide prompt, accurate, and comprehensive logistical services. The harbor effectively manages 
import, export, and transshipment containers, with a container handling capacity of up to 10 million TEUs 
annually. Its strategic location makes it the ideal choice for a marine transportation hub in East Asia. Of the 
six leading ports in the Asia-Pacific region (Kaohsiung, Singapore, Hong Kong, Pusan, Shanghai, and 
Tokyo), Kaohsiung Port's links are closer to the other five ports by an average of 53 hours of navigation 
time. 
 
  In order to facilitate the goal of establishing a transshipment center as well as a modernized 
maritime managing structure, the MOTC has implemented a policy of cooperation between cities (counties) 
and ports by organizing "Shipping Affair Administration" and reforming all port authorities into special public 




III.  STRATEGIC TRIGGERS FOR REFORM 
 
Notwithstanding the weaknesses of Philippine institutions, the institutional context is surprisingly 
strong on some “fundamentals”￿a fairly developed nationwide judicial infrastructure, the presence of  
independent constitutional bodies, civil society watchdogs￿but is as yet not strong and effective enough to 
deliver the minimum necessary underpinnings for long-lasting reforms.  These institutions, although not 
directly involved in policy development, can help provide a stable environment for furthering meaningful 
policy changes in the country. 
 
Commitment to develop resources and institutional frameworks 
 
A serious policy development process cannot be commanded from the outside, but needs 
committed leadership from within, correctly from the topmost levels of the state. While pressure for reform 
can come from below—indeed, this can effectively supply a broad social consensus—any effective program 
must be supported from the top. Yet any strategy that relies only on high-level leadership will be vulnerable 
to the many uncertainties of the political process. Marshalling credible commitment should cover key state 
institutions. A “convergence” of strong players would make for a breakthrough performance in policy   46
development. Broadening the number of stakeholders in various sectors and encouraging their participation 
in decision-making can end policy biases, while ensuring that the decisions are made above board, open to 
the scrutiny of the public.  
 
This also implies that the first order of business is to put constraints on the state’s instruments of 
discretion on franchising, licensing, policy-making. A good starting point is to devolve this power of 
discretion and effectively reduce capture by ensuring big ticket items are out of the reach of the few big 
players who hold concentrated authority. Of course, this might simply decentralize corruption.  But at least 
dealing with greater number of rent seekers restricts any one faction to a limited domain and prevents it 
from capturing regulations. 
 
At the same time, a key focus of policy reform efforts should be on enhancing accountability and 
taking maximum advantage of ongoing reforms in public management  (for instance, there are current 
efforts to upgrade public expenditure management in the Philippines). The priorities should include creating 
new accountable structures within and without agencies, increasing formal channels of access to decision-
making (since secrecy is a formula for capture), enhancing oversight through participatory strategies, and 
deconcentrating political and economic power through deeper decentralization and privatization.   
 
Sustainability also means digging deeper into the underlying sources of institutional weaknesses 
and strengthening institutions that can resist them. One key measure is to build public service neutrality: 
ensure that the public service is politically neutral. At this time, the Philippine civil service is heavily 
politicized and a repository of political patronage. Reform efforts will contribute to a meritocratic public 
service that will resist policy bias and will encourage decision-making in the public interest. Likewise, there 
is a strong need to strengthen corporate governance.  Restraining business misbehavior obviously will limit 
the range of public policies that are potentially “for sale”. 
 
 
IV.  INSTITUTIONS AND STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT THE REFORM PROCESS 
 
If it were to cast a wide net, the policy development process ought to have substantial economies 
of scope---appropriate bundling of various ex-ante (capacity building) and ex-post (agency outputs) 
elements, and benefit spillovers. Seen in this light, how should policy development “services” be assigned to 
executing agencies in the Philippines? 
 
Following Dee (2006), at least two types of agencies or institutional arrangements can support a 
wide-ranging process.  The first is one that can, on its own, “radiate power” and handle an array of policy 
analytic instruments for independent policy review. The second type is one that can coordinate policy 
development across different instrumentalities, ensuring that each unit or office has access to instruments 
most appropriate to its own initiatives. 
 
Independent policy review  
Consider the first type of institution.  According to Dee, several factors are central to a well 
designed institution: independence of approach, economy-wide view, and with adequate resources. If 
statutory autonomy is the most important factor, presently, no single policy agency would fit the description.  
Potentially, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)) may be the agency according to 
Dee’s model.  The 1987 Constitution ensures it: Article XII, Section 9 provides that “the Congress may 
establish an  independent economic and planning agency …which shall, after consultations with the 
appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units, recommend to Congress, 
and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for national development.” 
Section 9 further stipulates that “until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and   47
Development Authority shall function as the independent planning agency of the government.”  However, 
Congress has yet to pass an enabling law to implement the Constitutional directive. 
On the basis of its mandate, NEDA is also well positioned to provide an economy-wide 
perspective. It is the only agency which has a whole-of-economy outlook, and is well-placed to install 
institutional strategies that can improve the country’s microeconomic policy structure; every other agency is 
focused on narrow sector concerns.  
As a public body with a clear constitutional mandate, NEDA has “latent” powers to mainstream 
policy development in the bureaucracy and conduct independent policy review but it has not exercised it, 
choosing instead to act as a mere coordinator of government policies and programs.  NEDA is currently 
hounded by institutional weaknesses, e.g., loss of key technical personnel and inability to find suitable 
replacements to those who have resigned, transferred to other agencies or retired. Years of coordination of 
various agency plans, the political leadership’s lack of a clear vision and coherent development strategy for 
the country, and a rather short attention span that is driven by its ”coordinative” role, have made NEDA prey 
to routine national planning management. 
A recently issued presidential fiat, Executive Order 230, reorganized NEDA to enhance its ability to 
coordinate the development planning and policy formulation process. It is tasked to provide technical staff 
support and assistance including the conduct of studies and the development of policy measures and other 
recommendations. These key ingredients put NEDA right up the policy development alley.  Even without the 
necessary legislation that will transform it into an independent planning agency, NEDA can choose to take 
advantage of its economy-wide view and exercise its latent powers to plan, review, and act as chief 
economic advisor to the Executive.  The drawback is that NEDA proper as a policy making body is 
composed of the President of the Philippines and key cabinet secretaries.  By its very nature, NEDA is a 
political organization.  It is serviced by a NEDA secretariat that can assume the independent policy review 
suggested by Dee but the reality, however, is that as a secretariat, it is duty-bound to adhere to the political 
viewpoint and decision of the NEDA (proper). 
Looming in the horizon as an independent policy review body is the Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies, a research institute created on September 26, 1977 by Presidential Decree No. 1201. 
PIDS is organized as a non-stock, non-profit government corporation and enjoys a certain degree of 
financial autonomy because of the endowment provided to it by government upon its creation.  
PIDS was established to respond to the critical and growing need for research for planning and 
policy formulation.   In general, PIDS research is envisioned to help government planners and policy-makers 
in the executive and legislative branches of government. An independent board of trustees who are not 
political appointees but who were selected on the basis of their integrity, professionalism and academic 
qualifications provides policy direction to the research agenda of the institute.  The PIDS has proven itself as 
an independent and impartial policy analyst throughout its more than twenty five years of existence.  The 
research studies and policy analysis conducted by the research fellows collaborating with a network of 
private and state universities have always taken the interest of the country at large.  Its main drawback is 
the small size of its endowment which has compelled it to seek an annual subsidy from the Department of 
Budget and Management.   
 
Coordination of policy-making across institutions 
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The second type of institution is an agency that can exercise an agency-wide or inter-agency 
coordination.  Along this line of thinking, the Department of Budget and Management, as keeper of the 
purse, would be better placed than other agencies, provided it has the organizational will, capability and 
incentive to ensure wider policy coordination and to organize and head an inter-agency policy coalition.  Its 
clout rests on the fact that it demands adherence to and implementation of policy reforms as a conditionality 
for releasing agency funds.  It has espoused public expenditure reforms and has openly required various 
line agencies and corporations to adhere to performance-based and outcome-oriented fiscal culture.  It has 
announced that government budgeting system will shift to a performance-based system by the year 2007, 
which creates an environment that demands improved performance by government agencies and imposes 
accountability for resource use.  
Indeed, it is due for a functional shift from purely fiscal management agency to a more expansive 
public sector management entity, a strategic redirection that could provide a better organizational platform 
for policy coordination.  A path identified by analysts and donors alike is the critical advantage not only of 
linking the planning and budgetary functions but also of integrating the NEDA and DBM into one planning 
and budget department.  But the effort will require strong organizational energy and political will, and may 
not be realized in the very near future given present political preferences. 
 
Ensuring credibility of existing regulatory agencies 
 
At this stage, absent both an independent policy review body and a coordinating agency, it makes 
good economic and political sense to place bets on regulatory agencies, providing them with enough 
authority, independence and resources to handle their job.  There is a need to grant statutory independence 
to these institutions, drawing experience from the successful creation of an independent central bank, that 
is, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, acknowledged as the only Philippine agency with true statutory and 
financial autonomy.   
 
Statutory independence can help regulatory agencies face several regulation-related problems 
more confidently: (1) how to prevent the incumbent firms from extracting unreasonably large profits from its 
customers (the price regulation problem)---the incumbent firms do enjoy substantial market power; (2) how 
to ensure that the incumbent firms deliver quality services (the service delivery problem); (3) how to create 
market conditions that foster competition (the entry problem); and (4) how to guarantee that regulatory 
arrangements, if fair and reasonable, are enforceable and politically durable (the commitment problem).   
 
In a context where institutions remain weak and ineffective, there are a few things which can be 
done to help fortify regulatory agencies, following Smith and Wellenius (1999).  
 
The first is to reduce the need for agency decisions.  It is unwise to expect regulatory agencies to 
do a lot early in its functional life.  The more pragmatic approach is to make regulatory action less 
necessary.  An effective way to do it is to accelerate competition, that is, open the market quickly to new 
entrants.  That makes the job of the regulator more wieldy, as it resolves issues among several influential 
players or constituencies. The more providers there are, the more the regulator can have access to 
alternative sources of information on sector issues, lessen the risk of regulatory capture by any one 
operator, and offset some of the dominant operator’s market power. 
 
Competition also accelerates the gains from reform.  For instance, when competition was allowed 
in the core telephony business, it generated powerful incentives for the incumbent to perform better. PLDT 
sped up investment to catch up with demand only after the Philippine government issued licenses in 1993 
for mobile service and for several new international gateways to consortia committed to significantly 
expanding local telephone facilities in regions throughout the country. By 1996 the number of lines in service 
had almost tripled, to 1.8 million. Large initial productivity gains by PLDT made it possible to reposition itself   49
for competition, but opening the market prevented it from using these gains to entrench its dominant 
position. 
 
Another way is to prepare regulatory rules beforehand.  If rights and obligations of an operator or 
class of operators need to be delineated, it is more advantageous and hence advisable to write these into 
licenses, contracts, or laws. That will facilitate technical assistance for establishing up front a detailed base-
case regulatory environment.  Specifying initial regulatory rules add up to a fairly robust regulatory 
framework. For instance, it made practical sense for the Philippine government to immediately introduce 
some competition in all services by authorizing more operators to provide local, cellular, domestic long-
distance, and international telephone services alongside PLDT, the dominant player. 
 
When rules are ambiguous, they invite confusion and disorder. For instance, when interconnection 
agreements were treated simply as a commercial matter to be agreed between the parties, the outcome left 
much to be desired. Interconnection disputes arose, with NTC initially not being able to provide effective 
regulatory adjudication.  Every telecom firm would have been better off if NTC were allowed by law to lay 
down up-front default interconnection terms (both price and technical) which all parties had to follow. 
 
Yet another means to reduce agency decision-making is to keep operators’ obligations reasonable.  
Enforcing tough regulations on operators may seem socially beneficial, but a hard stance can lead 
regulators to unbearable situations.  For instance, requiring new entrants to stick to stiff rollout obligations, 
with investments that go on the far side of what is commercially viable, risks coercing companies to 
undertake bad investments, leads operators to demand special privileges (such as longer exclusivity), and 
makes  renegotiation a constant need. 
 
The second is to raise regulatory credibility. In an environment of weak governance, some critical 
measures can do much to improve the credibility of regulatory agencies.  These include ensuring there are 
enough legislative provisions on agency jurisdiction, autonomy, access to information, timeliness of the 
appeal process, enforceability of decisions, staggered terms of office for commissioners, and forbidding the 
removal of commissioners except for cause.  Other measures that are also in order are adopting open 
regulatory processes to help ensure that decisions will not be overturned arbitrarily, thereby increasing 
investor confidence; building public trust and support, especially on issues that are valued by consumers 
(billing accuracy and practices, quality of service, customer redress, geographic coverage and access by 
non-subscribers to public facilities like payphones and tele-centers). 
 
The third is to use resources effectively. The focus of regulatory action can shift from relationships 
between operators and government (licensing) to relationships between operators (interconnection) to 
relationships between operators and consumers (prices, complaints). That suggests that regulatory 
agencies may falter if they rely chiefly on internal skills, which are unlikely to vary widely and be deployed in 
a timely way.  Conflicts inevitably arise between incumbent operators and new entrants, between new 
entrants, between operators and consumers, and between operators and regulators. Regulatory, 
administrative, and judicial resources may be rapidly deluged by the magnitude and complexity of cases. 
The agency can instead bank on a broad range of alternative dispute avoidance and resolution methods, 
including negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Of course, to avoid dilatory tactics---the incumbent operator 
may have incentives to let the process last unnecessarily long---the dispute resolution process should 
include firm deadlines for completing the process, and authority to empower the arbitrator or mediator to 
decide if the process fails. Information asymmetry---operating companies know more about the sector than 
the regulator---puts the regulatory agency at a disadvantage, but it is possible to reverse this adverse 
situation by putting the operators to work for the regulator.  For instance, it should be the regulated 
companies which should prepare detailed proposals for offering new services or revising price schedules.  
In this case, the regulator can draw assistance from consultants, and subject the proposals to review by 
other stakeholders.   50
 
At the same time, political accountability is perhaps the most crucial constraint needed to boost the 
performance of regulatory agencies. An important step is to increase the transparency of the decisions 
made by regulators by ensuring access to information; wider publication and information dissemination with 
the aid of ICT, and encouraging public debate. In favorable contexts, such mechanisms can be created 
within regulatory bureaucracies. Measures in place to fortify these institutions will contribute to improving the 
overall microeconomic foundations of the Philippines’ economic performance.   
 
The Philippines has experienced some moderately successful policy reforms since the end of 
martial rule in 1986 when the Aquino administration restored the democratic framework for the country.  
Former President Aquino dismantled sugar and coconut monopolies, liberalized trade and the financial 
markets and started the privatization of state-owned enterprises.  Subsequent administrations tried their 
hand in pushing outward the policy reform envelope.  The reforms in telecommunications led to the entry of 
more players and an improvement in access to telecommunications services.  The privatization of the water 
distribution system in Metro Manila through a competitive bidding of the concession was initially successful.  
The water tariffs were substantially reduced from the prevailing tariff imposed by the government-owned 
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and coverage was expanded. But the second of 
two concessionaires encountered major difficulties a few years after winning the contract and withdrew from 
the concession.   
 
The locomotive of Philippine policy reforms is faltering.  Policy reform is not a sustained but a 
‘boom-bust’ effort, which has created a pathetic and unstable policy environment. Private investors have 
expressed concern over the situation with a private group pointing out that ”except for telecommunications, 
the Philippines now has a reputation as a risky environment for private infrastructure; investors perceive 
very high risks and foreign interest in private infrastructure is weak.”1 Somehow, institutional constraints 
contributed to the factors that have stymied policy reform efforts.  Worse, it appears that government finds 
itself as an enemy of good policy outcomes.  The government has either reversed policy in critical areas 
such as trade and credit or stalled the fruition of good policy, e.g., electoral reforms.  An example of a policy 
reversal is a recently issued executive order, which lifted the prohibition against the provision of loans by 
government line departments and agencies to so-called target beneficiaries.  Both Philippine experience 
and research unquestionably showed the inefficiency of subsidized credit programs and the huge fiscal cost 
of providing dole-outs.  Learning from this experience, government issued an executive order in 1998 which 
terminated those subsidized credit programs and encouraged private financial institutions to be more active 
in the credit markets (Llanto and others 1999). The withdrawal of government line departments and 
agencies from the credit markets brought beneficial effects: more private financial institutions felt 
encouraged to provide small clients with access to loans and other financial services; government realized 
huge savings by stopping funding of subsidized credit programs; micro-enterprises started to get funding 
from private banks, NGOs and credit unions.  However, in September 2006, the government, bowing to self-
serving political interests, reversed this policy.   
 
  A quick glance at the past policy reform experience shows how much headway the economy can 
make when there is committed leadership behind the reforms.  The ‘boom-bust’ cycle of reforms in the 
Philippine economy recurs because of the incompetence and low credibility of Philippine institutions and 
weak governance.  It seems that unlike the Philippines, other countries find it hard to turn their backs to the 
policy reform process once they have committed themselves to it. A search for an explanation leads one to 
the realization that mature political leadership and the presence of competent institutions such as a 
professional bureaucracy, independent commissions and  credible regulatory institutions, which have 
themselves become an interest group for policy reforms have much to do with their sustained effort along 
pathways of growth and development. 
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END NOTES 
 
i Senior Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development Studies and Professor, University of the Philippines, respectively.  
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Karl Jandoc. 
 
ii The Resolutive Commission is the appeals forum for the Preventive Commission’s decisions, and the first-instance 
forum for some cases.  See Guasch and Spiller (1999). 
 
iii The percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide (the survey covers 209 countries) that rate below 
the selected country.  Kaufmann and Kraay (2006) grouped countries into a three broad categories: exemplary – 
above 90th/between 75th to 90th; vulnerable – between 50th and 75th/between 25th to 50th , governance crisis - 
between 10th to 25th/bottom 10th .   
 
iv  The chart is from the Senate Economic Planning Office (2005).  
 
v MERALCO was accused of buying power from Quezon Power at P6.54 per kwh, from First Gas-Sta. Rita at P5.54 
per kwh, and from First Gas-San Lorenzo at P4.89 per kwh in December 2002 when NPC supplied MERALCO at only 
P3.62 per kwh. “Enrile Hits Rise in March Electricity Rates, Blames MERALCO PPA Charges,” Manila Bulletin, March 
12, 2003. 
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vi This section draws liberally from earlier research by Austria (2002), Serafica (2001, 1998), Llanto (2004), Llanto and 
Patalinghug (2005) and Llanto, Basilio and Basilio (2005).  Specific citations are dispensed with unless otherwise 
deemed necessary by the authors of this paper. 
 
vii Following Austria (2002), the paper limits the discussion of domestic shipping to the inter-island liner shipping 
industry because this is the sector of the (shipping) industry that is highly regulated and whose viability is highly 
sensitive to government policy.  However, MARINA contends that by virtue of RA 9295 and its IRR (effective 
December 2004) this sector is not highly regulated. 
 
viii Under Philippine practice, an executive order issued by a President can be revoked by a subsequent President.  An 
enacted makes permanent a policy issuance made under an executive order. 
 
ix There are suggestions that the shipping industry exhibit signs of being a natural monopoly.  Austria (2002), however, 
points out that economies of scale and size were shown to be an insignificant barrier to entry in the industry. 
 
x Recently, MARINA has been bombarded with requests from ship operators to intervene to stem the supposedly 
ruinous entry of new shipping companies.  The subsequent action of MARINA on these requests will show the 
seriousness of the agency to protect whatever modest gains competition policy have so far been accomplished. 
 
xi Sigua, R and Aguilar, G. “Maritime Incident Analysis Using GIS”, 5th EASTS Conference, October  2003.  
 
xii MARINA contends that given its limited manpower complement, it manages to put in place its monitoring and 
intervention mechanism to protect the public from unscrupulous practices of shipping operators.  This is also the task 
of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through its Philippine Shippers Bureau and Consumer Welfare and 
Trade Regulation Group.  The question remains, however, on how active MARINA is in its relation with the mentioned 
groups. 
 
xiii MARINA stresses that a number of new vessels are being acquired in recent years that boasts to be better equipped 
than previous acquisitions.  This translated into purportedly notable improvements in the quality of shipping services 
being provided in the major routes and in secondary routes as well.  That these translate into improved passenger 
safety will still depend on MARINA’s capacity to implement extant safety standards. 
 
xiv MARINA noticed that as a result of the deregulation policy under RA 9295, a considerable number of foreign entities 
signified their interest to go into joint ventures with domestic shipping operators and/or to provide funds for ship 
financing.  The question remains whether the Cabotage Law will be feasibly relaxed in order for these foreign 
companies to enter the industry and give the domestic firms ample competition. 
 
xv MARINA points to the unpleasant experience of Indonesia in relaxing their Cabotage Law .  Also, they contend that 
due consideration should be given to the Reciprocity Principle in the lifting of the Cabotage. 
 
xvi National Telecommunications Commission, “Memorandum for Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP),” March 29, 
2005. 
 
     
xvii Ronald Solis, Chairman, NTC, Speech on Imposition of Significant Market Power Obligations, delivered at the U.P. 
School of Economics, March 2006. 
 
xviii Ibid. 
xix For instance, the MARINA Administrator and two Deputy Administrators are Presidential appointees.   